Deconstructing the "Illusion School"

Review of Higashinakano, Shudo. The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. Tanaka, Masaaki. What Really Happened in Nanking: The Refutation of a Common Myth. Tokyo: Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact, 2006. Tadao, Takemoto, and Ohara Yasuo. The Alleged ‘Nanking Massacre’: Japan’s Rebuttal to China’s Forged Claims. Tokyo: Meisei-sha, Inc, 2000.

On December 13, 1937 the Japanese captured the city of Nanking. The battle of Nanking inflicted heavy losses on the Chinese, reducing the garrison force from 110,000-130,000 to 44,000-104,000.¹ Following the capture of the city, a six-week reign of terror was exacted on the resident population, but more specifically, the city’s garrison force. According to the best scholarly estimates, it would seem between 3,400 to 9,530 civilians and 18,500-52,000 soldiers were killed.² And as many as 8,000 to 15,000 rapes can be calculated from Lewis S. C. Smythe’s War Damage study. An assessment supported by Miner Searle Bates, who states, « 8,000 [rapes] was a careful figure set early in the process ».³

The Nanking « Illusion Faction » stands in direct contrast to the « Centrist Revisionist Faction » or the « Traditionalist Faction » in the admission to mass violence being committed by the Japanese armed forces. While these other two « factions » suggest between 10,000 to 400,000 killed, both very different in scale, they are still nonetheless horrific figures. In comparison, members of the « Illusion Faction » will suggest very few deaths (sometimes under the qualification of being ‘illegal’) actually happened.⁴ Those of the « Centrist Revisionist Faction » or the « Traditionalist Faction » will condemn those « heartless persons who alter primary sources to argue, “there was no ‘massive butchery’ at Nanking” (...) ».⁵ This article I hope will serve as a comprehensive review of denialist positions.

Setting the Scene - Falsification, Insular 'Scholarship', and Denialism

Unlike the other three authors, Tanaka’s activism goes back to the 1950’s. Only one day after Japan’s independence, his first book was published under the title On Japan’s Innocence: The Truth on Trial. Tanaka attempted to have Pal’s dissenting opinion published during the occupation but failed. He instead hired three part-time translators and started writing his book to be published post-occupation.⁶ While faithfully representing Pal’s arguments,⁷ the title misrepresented Pal. In his dissenting opinion Pal never explored the legality of Japan’s wars or atrocities, he instead only found the 28 defendants innocent of charges as per the indictment. In 1963, Tanaka would present Pal as « absolving Japan »⁸, but Pal held « Tojo and his group » morally responsible for their actions.⁹ Pal also did not absolve Japan, as he throughout his dissenting opinion condemned Japan’s « devilish and fiendish » atrocities. A few excerpts from Pal’s dissent are worth reproducing:

These are the instances of atrocities perpetrated by the Japanese Army against the civilians at different theatres during the entire period of the war. The devilish and fiendish character of the alleged atrocities cannot be denied. . . however unsatisfactory this evidence may be, it cannot be denied that many of these fiendish things were perpetuated.¹⁰ (emphasis added)

Keeping in view everything that can be said against the evidence adduced in this case in this respect and making every possible allowance for propaganda and exaggeration, the evidence is still overwhelming that atrocities were perpetrated by the members of the Japanese armed forces against the civilian population of some of the territories occupied by them as also against the prisoners of war.¹¹ (emphasis added)

Whatever that be, as I have already observed, even making allowance for everything that can be said against the evidence, there is no doubt that the conduct of the Japanese soldiers at Nanking was atrocious and that such atrocities were intense for nearly three weeks and continued to be serious for a total of six weeks as was testified to by Dr. Bates.¹² (emphasis added)

Tanaka, in On Japan’s Innocence, alleged that Pal, in his dissenting opinion, rejected the testimony of John Magee, Xu Chuanyin, and Chen Erguniang, even accusing them of being propagandists. As Takashi Yoshida notes, Pal never said Magee, Xu, or Chen’s gave false testimony and instead claimed they were prone to uncritically accepting what they would normally consider fanciful. Tanaka’s presentation also creates the « false impression » that they were the only witnesses Pal heard.¹³ This would mean that Tanaka had a long, but easily documented, history of falsifying what Pal has said.¹⁴ And by the turn of the 1980s, Tanaka began his crusade of denial. In 1984, The Fabrication of the “Nanking Massacre” was published to warm acclaim from Japanese conservatives and nationalists. But the book was also effectively a denialist pet project, where Tanaka enjoyed support from newspapers like Sankei Shinbun, in 1983, in collecting source material.¹⁵ Many of the errors present in this book are repeated in What Really Happened in Nanking, so I will avoid discussing it in detail.

In 1985, Tanaka published Matsui Iwane’s diary and falsified over 900 passages by altering, adding, or deleting sensitive content. Tanaka’s « mistake » was discovered by Itakura Yoshiaki, whom Tanaka alleges of having only criticized him for « misread[ing] portions of Gen. Matsui’s handwritten diary ».¹⁶ This oddly aligns with Tanaka’s excuse that his alterations were « mistakes » originating from Matsui’s « illegible » handwriting that left key passages « open to interpretation». Far from accepting that Tanaka couldn't read « the general’s unique grass style handwriting »,¹⁷ Itakura criticized what he saw as an « unbelievable ethical violation ».¹⁸ While Tanaka’s excuse can explain some instances of alteration, like « a few tens of thousands of stragglers » being changed to « a few thousand stragglers »,¹⁹ « the justification does not explain some changes ».²⁰ In one instance Tanaka deleted part-of an entry from February 6th, 1938 relating to a break down in morale among the Japanese soldiers, which caused fear among the Chinese.²¹ In a December 20th, 1937 entry Matsui wrote that looting and rape were « inevitable » in the « situation », but Tanaka added that this was « highly regrettable ». In another entry relating to the pacification of the Chinese, Matsui wrote, « all we have to do is to make them attached to us, treat them with affection and take pity on them. » This entry was altered by Tanaka to say « we have to treat them [the Chinese] tenderly, make them attached to us, and take pity on them. All we have to do [to accomplish this] is to have a sense of mercy. »²² The last example is more concerning as Tanaka not only « emphasized » it, but also commented « [t]his passage exemplifies Matsui’s attitude toward the Chinese people ».²³

In 1987, Tanaka then published What Really Happened in Nanking in Japanese where he repeats many of his previously discredited arguments.²⁴ In 2000, as part of a larger denialist campaign against Iris Chang’s The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II, an abridged copy of Tanaka’s book was published in English by Sekai Shuppan - the Japanese publisher of Mangajin which translates cartoons. Copies of this book were handed out by a fake institution to members of the Association for Asian Studies.²⁵

Takemoto Tadao, a Professor of French Literature, and Ohara Yasuo, a Professor of Shinto Studies, published The Alleged “Nanking Massacre”: Japan’s Rebuttal to China’s Forged Claims in 2000. The book is flippable between Japanese and English. They wrote against what they ‘believed’ to be a PRC campaign to hurt Japanese-American relations and appealed to the American public to oppose these efforts, a call that likely had zero effect.²⁶ One could easily argue this is the least interesting of these three books.

While too much can be said about Tanaka Masaaki and too little about Takemoto Tadao and Ohara Yasuo, the same cannot be said about Higashinakano Shudo, as this man is the last leg of the « Illusion Faction ». Just like Ohara and Takemoto, Higashinakano had no specialization in the topic. (At least in Tanaka’s favor he was Matsui’s secretary and close to many veterans despite all his faults.) Higashinakano entered into the discussion to fight the « masochistic » left-wingers and enemies from abroad like Iris Chang. Before 1995, no one had heard of him, and it was only in 1992 that he gained an interest in the Nanking massacre after a discussion with a member of the 16th division, who had « never » heard of or seen a « massacre.» While much of his biography is relevant,²⁷ I will avoid it in favor of discussing how members of the « Illusion Faction » have rallied around him as one of the « invincible scholars who will put an end to the [Nanking massacre] debate ».²⁸ To quote from Kasahara Tokushi’s « Higashinakano Osamichi: The Last Word in Denial » article:

The cartoonist Kobayashi Yoshinori (...) says « This is the latest, most reliable historical study; if you can’t refute it as a historian, you might as well close up shop. » The Sankei Shinbun columnist Ishikawa Mizuho states that « excellent scholars have emerged from the ‘illusion faction’ [as] of late; Higashinakano is one of the best. » But perhaps the ultimate platitude comes from University of Tokyo emeritus professor Fujioka Nobukatsu: « Higashinakano spent eight years completing this work.... based on a wide-ranging study of the sources, he concludes with impeccable logic that ‘there was no Atrocity.’ (...) »

Actually, there is not much new to Higashinakano’s thesis; it is largely a rehash of older arguments by the denial and illusion factions. Left-wing historians in the Society to Study the Nanking Incident (Nankin ken) have published “Nankin daigyakusatsu hiteiron” 13 no uso [13 Lies told by deniers of the « Nanking massacre » - DH], which exposes the logical inconsistencies in those arguments and the dearth of empirical documentation to support them. (...)²⁹ (emphasis added)

Against all this praise, as Kasahara points out, Higashinakano has actually only repeated the arguments of those who came before him. As an example of regurgitation, Fujioka Nobukatsu cited that the ICNFZ reported only 47 civilian deaths at the hands of the Japanese military to the embassy in protest. Higashinakano, using the same source - Itakura Yoshiaki’s A Study of the numbers killed in the Nanking massacre - uses the same figure. This practice is not limited to Higashinakano either; as another example, Watanabe Shōichi regurgitated Tanaka Masaaki’s argument that John Magee’s testimony was exaggerated because he only witnessed three atrocities personally.³⁰ This means the « Illusion Faction » has long been stuck in insular ‘scholarship’.

« Why "revisionism" isn't » ?

Gord McFee, a long time ago, established for us a useful framework for identifying why historical negationism isn’t historical revisionism:

• Negationists accept a pre-determined conclusion and use the historical method to work backward. They carefully select evidence that supports this conclusion while dismissing or ‘proving’ the falsity of sensitive documents.

• Negationists invent a conspiracy theory in which all the evidence is fabricated, erroneous, or misrepresented.

• « Falsus in Uno, Falsus in Omnibus » - Demonstration of ‘faults’ in a type of evidence, then declaring that all evidence of this type is dismissible.

This framework will be useful as it distinguishes serious attempts at revisionism from those closely aligned to the « Illusion Faction », like Itakura Yoshiaki, and those who are members of it. Few will agree with me on this point, but Negationists often use sophist versions of legitimate inquiry to formulate their narratives. It is my contention that « Illusion Faction » holds to a scholarly bankrupt position that cannot withstand scrutiny. They are rightfully called « deniers » by the Japanese historical community and fit all of the categories listed by Gord McFee. Sometimes they even openly admit to a pre-determined conclusion. For example, Higashinakano, in the Japanese edition of his book, wrote:

As to whether there “was” or “wasn’t” a Nanking Atrocity, it’s very hard to prove that there “wasn’t.” In fact it’s virtually impossible to find direct evidence of this or any other negative proposition. Can anyone directly prove that there are no invisible men or aliens from outer space? (...) [But] there is one indirect way to prove that they do not exist. Let’s say some man claims that these entities do exist. Then we must examine, down to the last minute detail, his every oral testimony and piece of written evidence, in an effort to ascertain that these are absolutely reliable. If there is a speck of doubt as to the logic of an oral testimony or the reliability of a written piece of evidence, we must reject that man’s claim. Logically speaking, this is the only proof - albeit indirect - that invisible men and aliens from outer space do not exist. This is the approach I take to the study of Nanking.³¹

Historians do not adopt this approach to study any event, and hopefully, the reasoning is obvious as to why.³² The « Illusion Faction » also regularly invents a conspiracy theory which they look to stand against. The evidence does not support their contention that a massacre didn’t happen. While not discussed in much detail in this review, all three authors find themselves in a struggle against « leftist masochism » and the Chinese Communist Party. And, of course, Falsus in Uno, Falsus in Omnibus. A policy regularly adopted by the « Illusion Faction » in relation to any Chinese source that states a massacre happened.

What really happened in Nanking?: deconstructing a 'refutation'

(Re)defining « massacre »?

According to Tanaka « we must first define the word massacre » because « we may repeat a mistake that others have made ». Historically, massacre has been used to describe indiscriminate immoral mass killings, without much clarity to requirements. Death tolls can range from as low as four hundred people to as high as four hundred thousand. Given the term’s vagueness, establishing some criteria would be important for any historical analysis, especially when a legal definition is lacking. Tanaka redefines massacre to mean « the unlawful, premeditated, methodical killing of large numbers of innocent people. »³³ This is a huge departure from not only scholarly definitions but also the definition of fellow negationists. To list a few examples:

1. Charles Krauthammer: « A massacre is the deliberate mass murder of the defenseless. »³⁴

2. Hillel Cohen: « A massacre is the murder of defenseless people in a distinct time and place, when the killers are not in danger. (…) How many victims does it take for a killing to become a massacre? (…) [H]uman rights organizations in Guatemala have decided that the murder of as few as three people, in accordance with the above definition, constitutes a massacre. A seminal event in American history, the Boston Massacre, had only five victims. Others place the minimum at ten. »³⁵

3. Jacques Semelin: « I will offer an empirical, typically sociological definition of massacre as a form of action that is most often collective and aimed at destroying non-combatants. »³⁶

4. Tomislav Dulić: « Massacre is the incidental mass killing of members of a religious or ethnic group in a local community that may or may not be organised by a central political actor. »³⁷

5. El Kenz David: « Conceived during the Middle Ages (around 1100) the word “massacre” refers (...) to the killing of a great number of individuals. (...) Henceforth, the word “massacre” defines the killing of a great number of defenceless people, mostly civilians. »³⁸

6. Jerry Keenan: « (...) by definition a massacre involves the wanton, indiscriminate slaughter of unarmed or helpless civilians. (...) The annihilation of a body of soldiers, defenders, etc., does not a massacre make. »³⁹

7. Robert Melson: « As a basic working definition, by massacre we shall mean the intentional killing by political actors of a significant number of relatively defenseless people. (...) In the modem world victims have usually included women, children, and noncombatant men. But the term can be extended to unarmed prisoners of war and to technologically inferior native populations who only appear to be genuine combatants. »⁴⁰

8. Will Coster: « This necessitates some definition of what a massacre is. The first Criterion is one of scale. (...) massacres are distinctly different from murders of individuals (...) Equally important is that massacres are not carried about by individuals, but by groups. (...) To define a killing as a massacre also implies the use of superior, even overwhelming, force. (...) The force is also usually concentrated. (...) Finally, the term is most often employed when the act is outside the normal moral bounds of the society witnessing it. Thus legal, or even some quasi-leagal, mass executions (...) have been excluded. »⁴¹

9. Higashinakano Shudo: « “Massacre” is defined as “the killing of a large number of people at the same time in a violent and cruel way.” (...) When defenseless civilians or prisoners of war are attacked and killed by an armed group, this is violence and brutality in the extreme, i.e., a massacre. »⁴²

While some definitions prioritize the killing of « civilians » or « non-combatants ». These definitions seem not to take « into account the frequent occurrence of armed civilians killing other unarmed civilians or combatants in times of war ».⁴³ Jerry Keenan has elsewhere stated, « [massacre] by definition implies the indiscriminate slaughter of helpless humans » which is less restrictive and can include the « annihilation of a body of soldiers » who are unarmed or « helpless ». If asked, it is unlikely that these authors would exclude the massacre at Fort Pillow of colored Union soldiers.⁴⁴ While we should specifically exclude « war casualties » this does not mean we should exclude cases of civilians killed in the context of battle.⁴⁵ The key themes are clear that Massacre means the indiscriminate, violent, murder of a significant number of defenseless persons. Tanaka’s attempt at defining massacre, in my opinion, falls far outside any normal conception of the term.

Population, Garrison, and the International Committee

In chapters 2, 3, and 5, he relies heavily on the materials from the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone published by Shuhsi Hsü. Tanaka is correct that any account that ignores these documents is suspect. But he applied no critical analysis to their contents, stating « that the total refugee population was 200,000 » in December 1937.⁴⁶ There is disagreement among historians about how to interpret this figure. Hata Ikuhito has stated this figure only represented the population within the safety zone and « did not touch on the population of the city as a whole. »⁴⁷ David Askew argues to the contrary that this reasoning is faulty due to the population being heavily incentivized into retreating to the safety zone.⁴⁸ Using Smythe’s War Damages study, Askew estimates the December 1937 population, after correction, at 217,000 to 235,000.⁴⁹ But this debate ignores a major problem for estimates generated by westerners of between 200,000 to 250,000 civilians as they are based on hearsay. Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi has noted that Western sources « exhibited an insular mentality, repeating and reinforcing one another’s estimates. These were mutually reinforced guesses giving the illusion of agreement (...) [that] carry no absolute guarantee of accuracy. »⁵⁰ In October-November 1937, the Chinese conducted a census and reported a population of 373,092.⁵¹ But according to Tanaka, the civilian population was between 120,000-200,000, which simply is untenable, based on Askew’s study and the Oct-Nov census. Tanaka also falsely claims the Nanking garrison was between 35,000-50,000. These figures appear to only « represent front-line fighting troops alone ».⁵² This means that while Tanaka suggests a population of « 160,000-250,000 Chinese », the population was probably somewhere between 260,000 and 340,000⁵³, If not higher.

Tanaka’s next argument relates to the « swelling » of the population from « returning residents ». The population had indeed increased from 217,000-235,000 in December 1937 to 250,000-270,000 by late March 1938.⁵⁴ During the massacre, the ICNSZ believed 50,000 more had entered the safety zone by mid-January 1938, increasing the population to 250,000. While this corroborates Tanaka’s claim that « by January 14, the population had swelled to 250,000 »,⁵⁵ he omits that the increase was attributed to residents from « ruined parts of the city ».⁵⁶ General Matsui wrote in his war diary that « residents seem to be returning gradually. »⁵⁷ For Tanaka, this line is key, as it « is proof that peace had been restored to Nanking », but Matsui also recorded in his December 15th diary entry that « Chinese civilians were still scared of the Japanese soldiers because of their misbehavior. »⁵⁸ Five days later Matsui recorded that « misbehavior » continued, stating « there was some looting committed by my soldiers (mainly furniture, etc.) and some rapes as well. » On December 26th Matsui « heard » of « looting and rape » and sent subordinates « to wipe out all such bad practices. » On the 29th Matsui recorded that the « violence shown by our troops [is] shocking. » That the « reputation » of the army was being « destroyed » and that a « severe punishment policy should be instituted ». Matsui believed that « discipline and morals » began to « gradually come under control » on January 6th but contradicted this a month later! On February 6th, Matsui, after a visit to Nanking, wrote that « military discipline is still slack and has not yet been fully restored. »⁵⁹ General Hata Shunroku on January 29th, 1938 confirmed this picture writing « the order and discipline among the China Expeditionary Force troops are deteriorating, and it seems that there occurred quite a few looting and raping cases » and recommended « General Matsui at Shanghai should be replaced by an officer on active service. » On February 19th, 1938 General Matsui handed over control to General Hata. Matsui emphasized to Hata, «In order to keep the order and discipline of the troops, an effort should be made to keep the troops stationed together and reduce the opportunities for troops to have direct contact with the local population. »⁶⁰

Tanaka also quotes from Pals’s dissenting opinion, representing it as a « general summation » of the prosecution’s case: « [o]nce the Japanese soldiers had obtained complete command of the city, an orgy of rape, murder, torture, and pillage broke out and continued for six weeks. »⁶¹ According to Tanaka, « this was an outright lie. Who would be foolish enough to return to a city where a massacre and unspeakable atrocities were taking place? »⁶² Probably quite a few were « foolish enough », as many are « foolish enough » to stay at home in disregard of mandatory hurricane evacuation orders.⁶³

« Heaps of enemy corpses » and 'false' witnesses

Miner Searle Bates gave testimony at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East on July 29, 1946, where he stated:

Q: What was the conduct of the Japanese soldiers toward the civilians after the Japanese were in control of the city of Nanking?

A:The question is so big, I don’t know where to begin. I can only say that I, myself, observed a whole series of shootings of individual civilians without any provocation or apparent reason whatsoever; that one Chinese was taken from my own house and killed. From my next door neighbor’s house two men, who rose up in anxiety when soldiers seized and raped their wives, were taken, shot at the edge of the pond by my house, and thrown into it. The bodies of civilians lay on the streets and alleys in the vicinity of my own house for many days after the Japanese entry. The total spread of this killing was so extensive that no one can give a complete picture of it. We can only say that we did our best to find out, in checking up carefully upon the safety zone and adjoining areas.

Professor Smythe and I concluded, as a result of our investigations and observations and checking of burials, that twelve thousand civilians, men, women and children, were killed inside the walls within our own sure knowledge. There were many others killed within the city outside our knowledge whose numbers we have no way of checking, and also there were large numbers killed immediately outside the city, of civilians. This is quite apart from the killing of tens of thousands of men who were Chinese soldiers or had been Chinese soldiers.

Tanaka finds exception to the emphasized portions of the testimony because, on December 15th, 1937, « Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun correspondents Wakaume and Murakami interviewed Bates (...) [who] told them that he was grateful to Japanese troops for their orderly entry into Nanking, and for having restored peace so expeditiously. »⁶⁴ But this is not a conclusion he can logically draw. Bates, on the same day, wrote to a friend in Shanghai that « Under these conditions the terror is indescribable, and lectures by suave officers on their “sole purpose of making war on the oppressive Chinese government for the sake of the Chinese people”, leave an impression that nauseates. » Bates further stated « the whole outlook has been ruined by frequent murder, wholesale and semi-regular looting, and uncontrolled disturbance of private homes including offences against the security of women. »⁶⁵ Bates’s testimony about the « shootings of individual civilians without any provocation or apparent reason » is corroborated by witness testimony, Nanking safety zone documents, private letters of Japanese soldiers, and Japanese diary accounts.⁶⁶

Tanaka quotes Bates, carelessly stating that « twelve thousand civilians, men, women and children, were killed inside the walls ».⁶⁷ He objects by noting « If there were indeed 12,000 corpses strewn about a city the size of Manhattan Island, they would have filled every street, lane, and alley. The stench of decomposing bodies, which can be detected within 100 meters, would have pervaded the city, nauseating its residents. »⁶⁸ This « strong odor of rotting corpses » was recorded by Zennai Asano, who added, « the sight and stench were so unbearable that I quickly walked down from the top of the city wall. »⁶⁹ Minnie Vautrin in her diary on February 25, 1938 recorded « that the odor was so bad that the men [of the Red Swastika Society] now have to wear masks. »⁷⁰ Tillman Durdin reported in the New York Times « Foreigners who travelled widely through the city Wednesday found civilian dead on every street. »⁷¹ This aside, it’s worth mentioning that Tanaka’s being too hypercritical of Bates’s choice of wording. Bates elsewhere has given the same estimate but never meant it represented the number of civilian deaths that littered the streets.⁷²

Tanaka, after citing five testimonials, goes on to say « We could cite any number of similar testimonies, but the point we wish to make is that no one saw “mountains of dead bodies” or “rivers of blood.” »⁷³ But this is also false, Kaku Yoshiharu recalled « 120,000 to 130,000 corpses near Xia Guan ». On December 17th, Yamasaki Masao recalled « There were different levels of “heaps of corpses”, but nothing is comparable with the heaps of corpses on the bank. If the corpses were piled up on the ground, it could become a real “mountain of corpses”. But as we had seen corpses so many times, we were not surprised at all. We all enjoyed our dinner indifferently(...) ». Yasuyama Koudou recalled « Driving through the gate, we were then on a ramp. The car moved slowly as if inching forward on airbags. In fact, the car was running over countless enemy corpses buried beneath. » He continued to recall « heaps of corpses » throughout the 16th, 17th, and 18th.⁷⁴ Even General Matsui recalled in his diary of the area around « Yinjiang gate and Xiagaun » being « in shambles », specifically recalling « dead bodies strewn in disarray everywhere, and it would take a lot of time to clean it up. »⁷⁵ Koudou further recalled, riding in a car with Matsui, they « drove quietly for two miles along the river band covered with piles of corpses, and it was utterly emotional. The commander’s tears were rolling down his face. »⁷⁶

Are reports of mass murder of POW's exaggerated?

A. Prisoners of war released?

Tanaka starts off chapter 7 by accusing Fujiwara Akira of misunderstanding a 1933 textbook entitled « Study of Combat Methods Used Against Chinese Troops ». The key lines come from a section entitled « Treatment of Prisoners », which Fujiwara translates as stating « Thus, even if you were to kill them [Chinese captives] or release them elsewhere, no one will broach the issue. »⁷⁷ Tanaka, however, translates it as follows:

In keeping with our policy toward prisoners of war of all nationalities, it is not absolutely necessary to remand or incarcerate Chinese prisoners of war while waiting to see how the war situation develops. With the exception of special cases, prisoners of war may be released where they were captured, or after having been moved to another location.

Tanaka adds « Nothing here states (or even implies) that it is acceptable to kill Chinese prisoners of war. »⁷⁸ He can only declare this by a sleight of hand, because he omitted this line:

There will not be so much of a problem even if we execute Chinese soldiers not only because the Chinese census registration is incomplete but also because there are quite a few soldiers of homeless origin whose presence cannot be confirmed easily.⁷⁹ (emphasis added)

Now the Hague Convention of 1907 outlawed internationally the killing or wounding « treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army » or « an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion ». But Tanaka argues that Chinese soldiers didn’t meet the following requirements in Article 1:

Article 1. The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions:

1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;

2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;

3. To carry arms openly; and

4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part of it, they are included under the denomination “army.”⁸⁰

« According to the Regulations, soldiers wearing civilian clothing do not meet the qualifications of belligerents » and because of this « [t]he execution of such soldiers is not a violation of international law. »⁸¹ Now, these requirements are meant for Guerrillas - « militia and volunteer corps » - and even if granted it is still illegal to execute POWs as Guerrilla’s without previous trial. This requirement is key:

With respect to Article 30 (Article 20 of Brussels) it has been remarked that in applying the penalty the requirement of a previous judgment is, in espionage as in all other cases, a guaranty that is always indispensable, and the new phrasing was adopted with the purpose of saying this more explicitly.⁸²

Or:

Punishment under martial law should, as far as possible, be inflicted only after inquiry by a military court, convened for the purpose. Such a court is inaccurately, though commonly, described as a “court-martial,” since that term is properly applicable, in British practice, only to a court instituted under the Army Act, 1881, for dealing with offenders belonging to the British Army.⁸³

Individuals offending against the laws of war are liable to such punishment as is prescribed by the military code of the belligerent into whose hands they may fall, or, in default of such code, then to such punishment as may be ordered, in accordance with the laws and usages of war, by a military court.⁸⁴

Meaning, to be executed, it was required that « plain-clothed soldiers » be court-martialed. Georg Rosen reported on January 20th, clearly with a better understanding of international law than Tanaka:

(...) This removal or “mopping up," as it was called in Japanese communiqués, consists of murdering what are now defenseless enemies and is contrary to fundamental principles of humane warfare. (...)

(...) Foreign eyewitnesses have also attested that the Japanese lured a good number of Chinese soldiers out of the Safety Zone by promising they would not be harmed and even given work, only then to execute them. No trials by military tribunal or anything of that sort were to be seen anywhere, and they would have been out of place amidst practices that made a mockery of all the rules of warfare and civilized behavior. (...)⁸⁵

Tanaka then quotes two legal scholars, Shinobu Junpei stating:

In the event that a party who fails to meet the qualifications of a belligerent engages in hostile conduct, international law dictates that that party be charged with a grave breach of international law, punishable by execution or a lengthy prison sentence.

And Tobata Shingejiro:

Those who fail to qualify as belligerents do not have the right to be treated as prisoners of war when captured by the enemy. They are guilty of grave breaches of international law, and must be punished accordingly.

Yes, this is true, but as another Japanese legal scholar, Sakutaro Tachi, wrote « a wartime felony should be heard in a military court » and executing offenders without a trial is « prohibited under the current customary international law ».⁸⁶ (Discussion over the legality will be returned to later.)

On December 13th, 1937, Kesago Nakajima, commander of the 16th division which executed between 4,000 to 12,000 Chinese soldiers,⁸⁷ wrote in his dairy « our policy is, in principle to take no prisoners, we attempted to dispose of them all ». To deny it’s clear implications, Tanaka cites Onishi Hajime’s explanation of the policy:

By “take no prisoners” Lt.-Gen. Nakajima meant that prisoners of war were to be disarmed and released. Chinese troops had been conscripted from all over China, but it was their country, and they could find their way home.⁸⁸

But this interpretation is literally contradicted later in the diary entry, where, in fear of a riot, he stated « I had additional units brought in by truck, and assigned them to guard and escort the Chinese ». It ended by stating « We would need quite a large ditch to take care of them, but we cannot find a large one easily. One solution might be to divide them into groups of hundred or two hundred and lead them to some other places to dispose of each group one by one. »⁸⁹

B. Over Four Thousand Prisoners executed at Mufushan, why?

At Mufu Mountain on Dec. 16-17th, 1937 around 14,000 to 18,000 Chinese captives were executed by the 65th Infantry Regiment.⁹⁰ On Dec. 14th, the Yamada detachment was ordered to occupy Mufu Mountain and captured 14,777 prisoners.⁹¹ They continued to take captives into the next day, the number likely increasing to 17,025 - a figure probably derived from a head count. Maj.-Gen. Yamada was unclear on what to do with the prisoners, stating « [I don’t know] whether we should kill them or let them live, I do not know what to do. »⁹² Yamada sent for instructions to Shanghai Expeditionary Army headquarters on December 15th and wrote in his diary, « The order says to have all the captives killed. »⁹³

On the 16th at 12:30, a fire erupted in the prisoner barracks and was possibly even set by the Japanese as an excuse. And « that evening we [the Yamada detachment] took some of the prisoners to the banks of the Yangtze and shot them to death ».⁹⁴ How many is unclear, but diaries suggest between 2,500 to 7,000 were killed using light and heavy machineguns.⁹⁵ This was simply a « trial execution ».

Tanaka then mentioned on the 17th the following happened:

Maj.-Gen. Yamada thought long and hard, trying to arrive at an equitable decision regarding the treatment of the prisoners. He finally decided to transport them to an island in the Yangtze River and release them. However, when they had neared their destination, a riot broke out during which about 1,000 prisoners were shot to death. There were Japanese casualties as well.⁹⁶ (emphasis added)

There are a multitude of faults with this understanding, and saying « there were Japanese casualties as well » is only but a distraction. According to this story, one officer and eight Japanese were killed, while 1,000-3,000 Chinese were killed due to the « revolt ».⁹⁷ But Tanaka doesn’t make this clear at all. Neither Major General Yamada Senji’s or Colonel Morozumi Gyosaku’s written records detail such an event and private diaries like those of Seigo Miyamoto record on Dec. 17th « we have already executed more than 20,000 people ».⁹⁸ As Ono Kenji documents, when compared with primary source documents, many aspects of the « self-defense » thesis make little sense. There was no prior releasing of noncombatants before the killings; the fire in the barracks broke out at noon on the 16th not at night, as claimed; and there is no description of mass escape of POWs.⁹⁹ Staff chief Iinuma, according to Yamamoto, believed Yamada and Morozumi planned to kill all the prisoners of war, offering the following description:

During the Yamada Detachment’s phased execution of more than ten thousand prisoners with the use of bayonets, they were taking a considerable number of prisoners at one time to a certain place one day.¹⁰⁰ (emphasis added)

Other flaws also exist - it is unusual to release prisoners at night, as described by Morozumi, and accounts describing the execution as an accident don’t mention the killing on the 16th.¹⁰¹ The account of Lance Corporal Tanaka Saburo explicitly contradicts the intention of « releasing » the prisoners on « an island in the Yangtze River »:

We said we would transport them temporarily to the island in the center [of the Yangtze], and assembled boats about halfway from shore. [But] after the boats pulled off, we fired on them from all sides at once to finish them off. In desperation, they climbed up on one another trying to evade our fire. They would pile on top of each other to a height of about three meters, fall down, pile on top of each other; and then repeat the process again.¹⁰² (emphasis added)

Primary source materials do not support Tanaka’s contentions. In fact, they demonstrate that there was no decision to release the prisoners. After all, Yamada had received orders that « all the captives [should be] killed ».¹⁰³

A Holocaust of Errors

1. Tanaka, in Chapter 9, misrepresents part of the Smythes War Damage survey. He claimed that Smythes survey only found 2,400 dead and that this figure was « biased » upwards, meaning it would overcount the number of dead. While Smythe detailed 10,950 casualties of which 2,400 were killed by direct violence. But Smythe also mentions that « total deaths reported were 31,000 or 29 per 1,000 residents » of which « 87 per cent of the deaths were caused by violence, most of them the intentional acts of soldiers. » So the table reproduced in his study only represents those killed in the walled city alone.¹⁰⁴

2. Tanaka claims in Chapter 5 that the international committee had 15 members, but fails to notice the number declined to 11 before the Japanese captured the city.¹⁰⁵

3. Tanaka cites and misdates a number of publications at the end of Chapter 10. He claims the Workers’ Daily published an article in 1946, but they only started publishing after July 1949. He claims Peoples’ China published 300,000 dead in 1947, but it didn’t start publishing until June 1953. Tanaka also attributes to Nanjing University a figure of « several hundred thousands » in 1948, but the university was opened a year later and the history department didn’t study the massacre until more than a decade later.¹⁰⁶

4. In Chapter 12, Tanaka claims that if a massacre happened « a protest would surely have been submitted to the League of Nations ». Specifically, China had protested Japan’s « cruel and barbarous conduct » in Nanking. This also included protests from the United States and British press, contradicting Tanaka’s claim in Chapter 13 that the « United States, Great Britain, or France » press didn’t file any protests.¹⁰⁷

5. In Chapter 14, Tanaka claims that only Timperley and Durdin reported on atrocities in Nanking, again a claim that is not substantiated. Western reports of a massacre were also written by C. Yates McDaniel of Associated Press, Archibald T. Steele of Chicago Daily, Leslie C. Smith of Reuters and Arthur Mencken of Paramount Pictures.¹⁰⁸ Reporting also came from Spain and the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁹

6. In Chapter 15, Tanaka denies the well-documented « gag order ». The Ministry of War, however, sent out a memorandum on « Guiding Principles for Giving Permission to Information Disclosures », that stated « any accounts or photographs » that contain « horrific images and give the impression of ill treatment » of Chinese Soldiers or personnel were « not permitted ». The same was true for « photographs of cruelty, except reports of cruel acts by Chinese soldiers ».¹¹⁰ John Rabe, in a diary entry from February 9th, 1938, states that he could only report « good things » about the Japanese due to censorship.¹¹¹ Cheng Zhaoqi cites multiple reports of atrocities by the Japanese military that were censored.¹¹²

7. Ho Ying-Ch’in reported in 1938 that 33,000 Chinese troops died in the Shanghai-Nanking Campaign. Tanaka writes « that there is no reference in this account to Japanese atrocities or a “Nanking Massacre.” »¹¹³ Sato Hiroaki suggested Ying-Ch’in « may not have thought of referring to it in his report simply because he accepted it as part of an act of war. »¹¹⁴ While this is possible, it’s also just as likely that Ho Ying-Ch’in overlooked Japanese crimes because his Military Report was about the war with Japan, not Japanese crimes. Tanaka avoids this alternative understanding of Ho Ying-Ch’in’s report.¹¹⁵

The Alleged « Illusion »: a rebuttal to the forged claims of pseudo-academics

Hypocrisy

Takemoto and Ohara, in their book, erect a strawman that ignores all Western and Japanese historiography in favor of presenting Iris Chang’s The Rape of Nanking, an imperfect and heavily criticized book,¹¹⁶ as a monolith representative of scholarship. Takemoto and Ohara offer no estimates for the death toll, but elsewhere in their book describe the murder of one person as a « slaughter » and the killing of 200 Japanese in Tungchou as a « massacre ».¹¹⁷

Like Tanaka,¹¹⁸ Takemoto and Ohara use Japanese propaganda photographs to disprove misattributed or ‘manipulated’ photographs alleged to be of Japanese atrocities.¹¹⁹ Kasahara, on this issue, has stated, « Some ‘deniers’ argue that Nanjing was much more peaceful than we generally think. They always show some photographs with Chinese refugees selling some food in the street or Chinese people smiling in the camps. They are forgetting about Japanese propaganda. The Imperial Army imposed strict censorship. Any photographs with dead bodies couldn’t get through. »¹²⁰ They also ignore the published photographic evidence by Yale’s Nanking Massacre Project.¹²¹

Deflecting blame onto Chinese Soldiers

Takemoto and Ohara to explain a mass number of corpses wearing « civilian clothing » state the Chinese had « a unique fighting organization » that would shoot « any soldiers [that] tried to escape » and note a number of Chinese soldiers were abandoned in need of medical care.¹²² But these KMT special forces only killed some 1,000 Chinese soldiers, and the number of Chinese soldiers in need of medical care that were abandoned and died was only 9,000.¹²³ Therefore, the aforementioned cannot be among Takemoto and Ohara’s « 17 different causes » of death.¹²⁴ The explanation for corpses in civilian clothing is found in US and British intelligence reports and press coverage. Archibald Trojan Steele reported that he « saw the dead scattered along every street (...) mounds of the bodies of executed men ». Frank Tillman Durdin reported that « killing of civilians was widespread. Foreigners who traveled widely through the city Wednesday found civilian dead on every street. »¹²⁵ U.S.S. OAHU report from January 17th, 1938 stated « Individual soldiers or small groups of them were allowed to roam at will fully armed. They apparently loot­ed and killed indiscriminately. A news reporter stated that bodies were piled high around the city gates after the Japanese arrival. »¹²⁶ Smythe’s survey uncovered that « practically all of the violence against civilians, was also done by the Japanese forces ».¹²⁷

Takemoto and Ohara also claim that Chinese soldiers, along with ‘plain-clothed’ soldiers, from the safety zone were the main culprits behind looting.¹²⁸ Bates recorded that the Chinese were engaged in looting in his December 15th, 1937 letter cited previously:

On the main streets the petty looting of the Chinese soldiers, mostly of food shops and unprotected windows, was turned into systematic destruction of shop­ front after shopfront under the eyes of officers of rank. (...) Thousands upon thousands of private houses all through the city, occupied and unoccupied, large and small, Chinese and foreign, have been impartially plun­dered. Peculiarly disgraceful cases of robbery by soldiers include the following: scores of refugees in camps and shelters had money and valuables removed from their slight possessions during mass searches; the staff of the University Hospi­tal were stripped of cash and watches from their persons, and of other posses­sions from the nurses dormitory (their buildings are American and like a number of others that were plundered were flying foreign flags and carrying official proclamations from their respective embassies); the seizure of motor cars and other property after tearing down the flags upon them.¹²⁹

Christian Kroeger conducted a field investigation a few days into the city’s occupation. He discovered that while German housing « is located nearby the retreat road of the Chinese army, it was in the evening from 12th to 13th that they had a hasty retreat from the main streets. I used to suspect that German houses were destroyed by the Chinese army during the retreat. However, when I went to check that in the afternoon of 13 December, I found everything is excellent without damage, the Chinese army has kept a very good discipline. » While it’s most definitely true that Chinese soldiers engaged in looting, it was mostly done by Japanese forces. Fukuharu Meguro recalled on the 16th « Everywhere, traces of looting by Chinese and Japanese soldiers can be seen. »¹³⁰ Kesago Nakajima wrote in his diary « Japanese troops engage in looting, paying absolutely no attention to whether the areas are under other troops’ jurisdiction or not. They forcibly broke into the residences in the areas, looting everything away. In one word, those who are thicker-skinned and more shameless gain more advantages. »¹³¹ Atau Kitayama in his dairy wrote on Dec. 16th « We at once commandeered a rickshaw nearby, and ordered a Chinese to pull back a rickshaw load of the drinks. In addition, we took back a lot of beds, furniture, wine, white sugar, solid candies, and gramophones etc. We had the stove on, drank beer and soft drinks, and talked heartily until midnight. » On Dec. 27th Atau wrote that « We went out of Hanzhong Gate to commandeer vegetables and a buffalo. »¹³² Smythes study discovered « most of the looting in the entire area » was done by the Japanese.¹³³ But Takemoto and Ohara state these were all misunderstandings.¹³⁴

Takemoto and Ohara further claimed that Chinese soldiers engaged in rape and were mistaken as Japanese soldiers, but as Bates stated:

Last night four Japanese went into a classroom of Nanking University Middle School. Details of their behaviors were unknown because due to witnesses were frightened. It was certain they took a girl with them. The Japanese were military police, and some of them were guards served at the gate of the middle school. They had Chinese cloth shoes on, and some were in Chinese garments.

Takemoto and Ohara asked how Bates could’ve known they were Japanese soldiers disguised as Chinese?¹³⁵ But Bates is pretty clear that some were in uniform and that he was familiar with them. Georg Rosen sent a memo to Berlin on « Japanese Propaganda Methods » which recorded Japanese troops looting the French embassy threatening to « report this as the work of Chinese. » As Kasahara notes the « SSA was generating false reports designed (...) to accuse the Chinese of perpetrating » such crimes.¹³⁶ There were instances where Chinese soldiers blamed rapes they committed on the Japanese,¹³⁷ but a number of rapes are documented in Japanese diaries and testimonial accounts. Kouzou Tatokoro recalled « Women were the most harmed victims, and all of them were raped, old and young. We rode motor vehicles (...) abducting women back to distribute them to soldiers, with each woman for 15 or 20 soldiers. » Mamoru Orita wrote in his diary on December 17th that two soldiers were under investigation for raping Chinese women.¹³⁸ As Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi noted their argument is deceitful, by « citing exceptional Western sources showing that KMT Special Forces or espionage units committed some atrocities, they claim that this accounts for most such acts. »¹³⁹

Does Systematic / Tolerated Murder, Looting and Rape require 'planning'?

Takemoto and Ohara begin by discrediting arguments that are not foundational to the historiography of the Nanking massacre. A) If the Japanese planned « systematic murder » and B) if the Japanese had a « policy of killing POWs ». So we should briefly consider what conditions lead to near-sanctioned systematic murder, looting, and rape.

Chinese accounts in the 1990s shifted away from past isolation of Japanese militarism as the main cause, highlighting a more inclusive account of direct and indirect Chinese actions that led to the massacre. Nanking, as Nationalist China’s capital, was to be a crushing victory and serve as an achievement in Matsui Iwane’s record into retirement. Being the capital increased Chinese resilience to the Japanese, and « thus the intensity of the battle ». As well, the Chinese conducted a « poorly organized » retreat that stranded tens of thousands of Chinese troops in Nanking, some of whom abandoned their uniforms and fled into the safety zone.¹⁴⁰ While Japan suffered 40,000 losses (9,000 KIA) in Shanghai, they only lost 2,000 soldiers on the Nanking campaign.¹⁴¹ So explanations in relation to fighting ‘intensity’ should be reconsidered.

Yamamoto notes multiple factors that made way for the massacre: A) The Chinese engaged in scorched-earth tactics, burning food and shelter the Japanese could’ve used. The Japanese were thereby forced to engage in a « pre-modern horde » requisition tactic of looting for supplies.¹⁴² B) Japanese military culture held surrendering soldiers in utter contempt.¹⁴³ C) He also notes « command irresponsibility » due to the unique independence given to lower-level commanders.¹⁴⁴ D) Executions were also conducted due to security concerns for Prince Asaka, as the victory day parade was on Dec. 17th, 1937.¹⁴⁵

As Yamamoto argues, the Japanese didn’t have a consistent policy of killing prisoners of war. Nakajima’s Dec. 13th diary entry of « tak[ing] no prisoners » was his own policy, but not one that he followed consistently.¹⁴⁶ The massacring of POWs, it appears, was also motivated by a lack of available food.¹⁴⁷ Orders were issued out cryptically,¹⁴⁸ Major Kodama Yoshio, for example, recorded that he was ordered by Nakajima « that Chinese soldiers who surrendered were not allowed to be taken prisoners but [should be] disposed [of]. » Such « disposal » required « large ditchs », as Yamamoto condemned Nakajima’s unit as a « savage killing machine ».¹⁴⁹

Takemoto and Ohara state that the passage from Nakajima’s diary doesn’t « necessarily mean ‘murder of the POWs’. »¹⁵⁰ But they fail to explain his search for a « large ditch ». Takemoto and Ohara cite an order from Sugiyama Hajime on August 5th, 1937 titled « Application of Rules of Engagement » which stated soldiers should « endeavor to respect international humanitarian law and do not kill enemy soldiers who apply for surrender ».¹⁵¹ They even suggest that of 10,000 « interned » POWs, 5,000 were sent to Shanghai « as laborers », as proof against the mop-up operations having a policy of « immediate execution ».¹⁵²

At 8:30 am on December 13th, the Tenth Army issued an order to « annihilate the enemy in Nanking ». At 9:30 am, the 114th Division issued a « mop-up » order to « annihilate the enemy inside the city. »¹⁵³ And at 12:00 pm, the 128th Infantry Brigade ordered « wiping out enemies at all costs ».¹⁵⁴ And explicit orders were issued at 2:00 pm by the 1st Battalion, of the 66th Regiment, which stated « Execute all the prisoners in accordance with the brigade’s order. Regarding the method for execution, what about making groups of dozens each, tying them up, and shooting them one by one? »¹⁵⁵ (emphasis added) They are on record as having killed 1,657.

The 7th Regiment of the 9th Division reported back on their « mop-up » operation that they « killed (by bullet and bayonet) 6,670 enemy remnants » between December 13th and 24th.¹⁵⁶ The Regiment’s leader, Isa Kazuo, wrote in his diary on December 16th; « [a]fter repeated mopping up operations for three days, we have severely dealt with about 6,500 people. »¹⁵⁷ This would mean the majority were killed within the first « three days ».

Toichi Sasaki of the 30th Brigade, part of Nakajima’s 16th Division, ordered prior to the « mop-up » operation that « [n]o unit will be allowed to accept prisoners until the divisional command issues a further notice. »¹⁵⁸ On January 5th, 1938 he wrote in his diary; « Ended mop-up. As of today we flushed out about 2,000 defeated stragglers in the city... We go on capturing those who persist in their insurgency, and we got rid of several thousand at Hsiakwan. »¹⁵⁹ All of which would imply multiple Divisions had a policy of immediate execution. John Rabe recalled in his diary on December 13th:

We run across a group of 200 Chinese workers whom Japanese soldiers have picked up off the streets of the Safety Zone, and after having been tied up, are now being driven out of the city. All protests are in vain. Of the perhaps one thousand disarmed soldiers that we had quartered at the Ministry of Justice, between 400 and 500 were driven from it with their hands tied. We assume they were shot since we later heard several salvos of machine-gun fire. These events have left us frozen with horror.¹⁶⁰ (emphasis added)

Takemoto and Ohara ask « what was the policy of the Japanese Army against the looting? »¹⁶¹ Matsui somewhat tolerated looting for some time, writing in his diary on December 20th; « I was told that our soldiers committed a few cases of robbery (they mainly stole furniture) and rape for a certain time period. It was inevitable for a certain number of those crimes to happen in view of the situation. »¹⁶² (emphasis added) Even the highest ranks had no quarrel with plundering, as Kesago Nakajima would later say to Matsui Iwane; « Why does the stealing of art pieces matter so much when we are stealing a country and human lives? Who would benefit from these items even if we left them behind? »¹⁶³ So the premises raised by Takemoto and Ohara in all regards are forfeit. Especially when the War Ministry directive from August 5th that they cite denies Chinese captives the status of prisoners of war. The document states, « [i]t is inappropriate to act strictly in accordance with various stipulations in ‘Treaties and Practices Governing Land Warfare and Other Laws of War’. » And because « it is inappropriate to follow all specific clauses » as « our empire is not in a full-scale war with China, so we must avoid using terms such as ‘prisoner of war’ or ‘prize of war’ that may imply the intent to start one. »¹⁶⁴

Were the operations of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force unknown to Japanese Military Authorities?

Takemoto and Ohara assert that no « Japanese high official had ever become aware of the ‘Nanking massacre’. »¹⁶⁵ They also cite Matsui stating « [t]he Nanking incident was so shameful » claiming he was only talking about the acts of ten soldiers.¹⁶⁶ Matsui Iwane’s statement offers the opposite implication, as the « atrocities by the Japanese » army were enough to « tarnish the glorious prestige of the emperor. » These « atrocities » couldn’t be a handful of crimes committed by « one officer and three soldiers ».¹⁶⁷ On trial, Matsui shifted between admission and denial, but his primary defense was « [a]s far as » he could « remember, no reports were made in my capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the CCAA, official or unofficial. »¹⁶⁸ His argument that he received no formal reports of a massacre was exposed during cross-examination when Matsui admitted to receiving reports from subordinate commanders.¹⁶⁹ In fact, so many reports were flowing in, that Anami Korechika after attending a War Ministry meeting on December 22, 1937, wrote in his notebook « The behavior of the Nakajima division in respect to women [referring to rape and abuse of women], murder, and violation of military conduct, were beyond description in terms of the decadence of national conscience and the miseries of war. »¹⁷⁰

Further corroboration is that Ishii Itarō, Chief of the East Asian Bureau of Foreign Affairs, in his IMTFE testimony, stated multiple reports were filed to the war office. Ishii in a diary entry from January 6th, 1938 wrote:

The letter from Shanghai explicitly described our army’s atrocities in Nanking. The looting and rape incidents described are too sad and shocking to hear. Alas, is this the Imperial Japanese Army I know?¹⁷¹ (emphasis added)

It is also known that reports were being forwarded to Foreign Minister Hirota Kōki, who then contacted the War Minister Sugiyama Hajime and received assurances that he would « act immediately, and to issue a strong warning. »¹⁷²

Denial, Deceit and the 'Invincible' Scholar: Japanese Crimes reappraised?

As discussed in the section on Tanaka, a 1933 infantry textbook contains a concerning passage that expresses disregard for Chinese soldiers. Higashinakano quotes Fujiwara Akira stating that the Japanese had « no objection to killing Chinese soldiers, though they were reluctant to execute Russian and German soldiers. »¹⁷³ He argues that this interpretation is « inconsistent with the wording and spirit » of the pedagogue. Unlike Tanaka, Higashinakano reproduces the whole excerpt:

In keeping with our policy toward prisoners of war of all nationalities, it is not absolutely necessary to remand or incarcerate Chinese prisoners of war while waiting to see how the war situation develops. With the exception of special cases, prisoners of war may be released where they were captured, or after having been moved to another location.

Chinese census laws are not uniformly enforced, and there are many vagrants in the Chinese military, whose identity is difficult to ascertain. Therefore, if they were killed or released at another location, there would be no repercussions.¹⁷⁴

Higashinakano tells us not to « confuse principles with exceptions », as, in « wording and spirit », this excerpt is « prisoners of war may be released ». But he misses the point that it « will not be so much of a problem if we execute Chinese soldiers », exudes a « contempt for the Chinese army » and « a telling distinction between Western states and China ».¹⁷⁵

Next, Higashinakano discusses the Vice-Minister of War, Sugiyama Hajime’s August 5th notice that Chinese captives were not to be given prisoner of war status.¹⁷⁶ He claims the « Japanese military certainty intended to adhere to international law, » but the Japanese military’s cadet school « did not provide any courses in international relations or international law. »¹⁷⁷ Which is a violation of international law.

Point in dispute #1: 1st Battalion of the 66th Infantry Regiment, 114th Division Battle report.

On December 13th, at 2 pm, the 127th brigade ordered: « all prisoners of war are to be killed ».¹⁷⁸ Higashinakano then argues that because this exact phrasing is missing from the 114th division or 128th brigade orders,¹⁷⁹ the 1st Battalion (of the 127th brigade) invented the order « for some reason », after the battle, « to justify the execution ».¹⁸⁰ This reasoning has a few flaws: first off, the 66th infantry regiment was under the 127th brigade and the brigade’s order was destroyed. Second, the battle report also does not contradict the orders to « annihilate / wipe out the enemy in Nanking », « annihilate / wipe out the enemy inside the city », or « annihilating / wiping out enemies at all costs » that were issued at 8:30 am, 9:30am, or 12pm in content or timing.¹⁸¹

Point in dispute #2: Nakajima Kesago’s December 13th, 1937 diary entry

Similarly, Higashinakano attempts to prove that Nakajima policy of « taking no prisoners » meant « disarm the Chinese. »¹⁸² He also claims that the « processing » of 23,300 « enemy soldiers » meant they were disarmed and released or executed for resistance.¹⁸³

1. Since our policy is, in principle, to take no prisoners, we attempted to dispose of all of them. However, they continued to surrender in droves, first 1,000, then 5,000, then 10,000. We could not begin to disarm such a large number of soldiers. They had completely lost the will to fight, and simply followed after us. They did not seem to present any threat, but if a riot had erupted, we would not have been able to control them. Therefore, I had additional units brought in by truck, and assigned them to guard and escort the Chinese.

On the evening of the 13th, we were required to make countless trips with the trucks. But since this event occurred immediately after a battle (which we had won), we were not able to act expeditiously. The Operations Section was unbelievably busy because we had to dispose of far more prisoners than we had anticipated.

2. Later, I learned that Sasaki’s unit alone had processed approximately 15,000 individuals, that a company commander with the garrison at Taiping Gate had processed approximately 1,300, that there was a concentration of approximately 7,000 near Xianhe Gate, and that enemy soldiers were still surrendering.¹⁸⁴

But he, or his editor, omitted this important line: (Tanaka, Takemoto and Ohara were all seemingly as allergic to this passage.)

We would need quite a large ditch to take care of them, but we cannot find a large one easily. One solution might be to divide them into groups of hundred or two hundred and lead them to some other places to dispose of each group one by one.¹⁸⁵

To discredit the interpretation that the policy was « executing [Chinese soldiers] as soon as we had captured them »¹⁸⁶ or adopting a « policy of total annihilation »,¹⁸⁷ he brings up the following points:

1. If “our policy is, in principle, to take no prisoners” meant that prisoners were to be executed immediately, orders to that effect would have been issued not only to the 16th Division, but also to all other divisions. However, there is no execution order in the official records of any other division.

2. Division Commander Nakajima might have issued an execution order, at his own discretion, to the 16th Division and only that division. In that case, one would expect to find the order in the records of the 16th Division, but no such order exists.

3. According to 16th Division records, attempts were made to “dispose of all of [the prisoners].” That would mean that they were summarily and indiscriminately shot to death. When the first 10 or 12 were executed, the sound of gunfire would certainly have been audible. Would “1,000, then 5,000, then 10,000” prisoners have surrendered after hearing the gunshots?

4. There would have been corpses everywhere. Having seen those corpses, would hordes of Chinese soldiers have submissively followed their enemies?

5. Nakajima “had additional units brought in by truck, and assigned them to guard and escort the Chinese.” If policy had been to execute prisoners on the spot, was it not his duty to do so?

6. Nakajima would have been disobeying orders in taking the action described in (5). Was he so determined to disarm the prisoners that he was willing to suffer the punishment meted out to those who defied orders? And why would he go to the trouble of making himself “unbelievably busy” requisitioning trucks and ordering emergency reinforcements?

If the policy in force at that time had been to shoot prisoners of war to death on the spot, Division Commander Nakajima would surely have made every effort to implement that policy. But he would also have mentioned his frustration at not being able to shoot 1,000, then 5,000, then 10,000 prisoners, because of their sheer numbers.¹⁸⁸ (emphasis added)

The policy was exclusively the 16th division’s, this might explain why it was not touched on in other divisions’ orders.¹⁸⁹ That one « would expect » a record of an order to « execute all prisoners » to be in the Status Report or Battle Summary of the 16th division makes little sense as they are too brief. Neither the Status Report nor the Battle Summary touches on captured or killed Chinese forces with the exception of a brief reference to « destroying enemies » near Yaohua gate.¹⁹⁰ We know that an order was issued because of Kodama Yoshio’s recollection and Major General Sasaki’s order that « no unit will be allowed to accept prisoners until the divisional command issues a further notice. »¹⁹¹ Nakajima Kesago’s diary entry states « mopping up in the city is mostly left to the Sasaki Unit » and « [a]ccording to information obtained later, Sasaki Unit disposed of about 15,000 captives ». In the same paragraph, it is mentioned that « seven or eight thousand captives are gathered near Xianhe Gate » and it was « necessary » to locate a « large ditch ». So clearly those « processed » were killed.¹⁹²

Higashinakano’s third point is built on the false premise: the surrendering « droves » came in the thousands from the start. That’s why he called in « additional units » for « guard and escort ». Those surrendering wouldn’t have found « corpses everywhere ». As the omitted paragraph makes clear, the plan was to « lead them to some other places » in « groups of hundred or two hundred » and « dispose of each group one by one ». He then accidentally proceeds to answer his fifth and sixth points.

Point of dispute #3: Yamada Senji and Mufu Mountain Massacre

As was briefly described above, Yamada Senji found himself in a predicament when he captured 14,777 Chinese. He was indecisive about « kill[ing] them or let[ting] them live » and would later send « a messenger to the SEF headquarters to obtain an appropriate instruction, the SEF ordered Yamada to “kill them all.” »¹⁹³ Higashinakano’s account of this incident is highly reliant on the testimony of Regimental Commander Morozumi Gyosaku. Before I detail why Morozumi is an unreliable narrator let’s first quote from Yamada Senji’s diary entry of December 15th:

I dispatched Cavalry 2nd Lieutenant Honma to Nanking to receive instructions regarding the disposition of the prisoners and other matters.

We are told to kill all of them.

All units are desperately short of food.¹⁹⁴

Higashinakano commented on this entry in a way that is difficult to follow:

There is a logical progression from the first to the second sentence. However, the third sentence, “All units are desperately short of food,” does not seem to follow. There is no connection between killing prisoners and the food supply. In fact, the food shortage would have been a perfect excuse for allowing the prisoners to starve to death. Deprived of nourishment, they would be too weak to resist, making it easier for the Japanese to comply with an execution order.¹⁹⁵

But even Higashinakano understands that « war journal entries were necessarily terse ». Yamada Senji’s diary entry « covered only the essentials » and the comment on food difficulties could be entirely irrelevant.¹⁹⁶ It might be worth mentioning that Seigo Miyamoto recalled on the 15th « At dusk, we started distributing some food to the captives. We are almost running out of food supplies for our own soldiers; it is not easy to provide food for the captives at all. »¹⁹⁷

On Dec. 16th, a fire broke out in one of the prisoner’s barracks, and this is key to Higashinakano’s narrative. Higashinakano states unambiguously that the fire « could not have been the result of carelessness » because the « prisoners were aware that they would have to sleep out in the cold if their barracks were destroyed. »¹⁹⁸ The prisoners were entrusted with « cook[ing] their own meals » and a fire broke out (at night) to supposedly enable an escape « during the ensuing confusion (...) at least 4,000 prisoners must have escaped. » But none of the field diaries make any reference to escaped prisoners. Photographs of Chinese POWs, believed to have been taken around the time of the fire, show them docilely sitting under guard next to a barracks.¹⁹⁹ So a planned mass escape is unlikely.

Here contradictions start to arise in Higashinakano’s book as he claims field diary « entries are inconsistent as to when the fire broke out. » He then claims that three of four diaries state « it started at about noon ».²⁰⁰

Higashinakano misinterprets Miyamoto Shogo’s diary entry of Dec. 16th as stating they « shot » 3,000 prisoners as a « last resort ». But Miyamoto actually wrote « the battalion decided to take an extreme measure and shot 3,000 captives by the riverside. »²⁰¹ Higashinakano also claims that Miyamoto recognized « this was military action taken against rebellious prisoners, which is condoned by international law. Miyamoto’s words - “A sight like that could never be seen, and never will be seen, anywhere but in a war zone” - eloquently communicates this fact. »²⁰² But this interpretation is not supported by the diary entry. Miyamoto’s likening to a battlefield is easily understood when compared with Kondo Eishirou:

We went to provide an armed escort and finished taking care of them. Any who managed to survive, we stabbed or slashed to death with bayonet and sword. Bathed in the bright rays of the mid-December moon that hung over nearby hills, the prisoners’ agonized cries of death were indescribably horrific. Only on the field of battle will one encounter such a sight. Having witnessed a scene never to be forgotten in our lives, we returned at about 9:30.²⁰³

Was the massacre of 2,000 to 7,000 POWs on the 16th a justified « military action taken against rebellious prisoners »? The reader may judge from this diary entry of Kurosu Tadanobu:

16 December: Clear. At about 1 p.m., twenty men from our Quartermasters headed for Mafengshan [recto: Mufushan] on a search and destroy mission. We had taken about 5,000 of the Chink soldiers, some of those we captured a couple of days ago, down to the Yangtze river bank and machine-gunned them to death. Afterwards, we cut and slashed them with bayonet and sword to our heart’s content. I figured that I’d never get another chance like this, so I stabbed thirty of those damned Chinks. Climbing atop the mountain of corpses, I felt like a real devil-slayer, stabbing again and again, with all my might. “Ugh, ugh,” the Chinks groaned. There were old folks as well as kids, but we killed them lot, stock, and barrel. I also borrowed a buddy’s sword and tried to decapitate some. I’ve never experienced anything so unusual...²⁰⁴

But what of Morozumi’s recollections? As Higashinakano concedes « Regimental Commander Morozumi mentions nothing about executions taking place on the banks of the Yangtze River, even though several of his men wrote entries to that effect in their war journals. »²⁰⁵ So why should we consider him a reliable narrator? According to Morozumi’s account, the « Japanese fired their guns to prevent them [the Chinese prisoners] from fleeing » and « if you moved away from the scene of the fire, you couldn’t see anything » which is false considering the fire broke out at noon.²⁰⁶ And as previously detailed he recounts a mass escape that is uncorroborated.

Morozumi said they « assembled all remaining prisoners on the south bank of the Yangtze River », waited « until dark », all just to transport them for release on the « north bank ». Morozumi stated a revolt broke out around « midnight ». Supposedly « Chinese troops » opened fire from « north bank » leading to « utter chaos ».²⁰⁷ If this is true it would’ve actually been the Japanese Tenth army’s Kunisaki Detachment.²⁰⁸ But this is where problems begin, as Hata Ikuhiko and others argue it is unusual to, « release » prisoners at night. Their massacre was also planned in advance, which is clear from Tanaka Saburo’s remark « after the boats pulled off, we fired on them from all sides at once to finish them off. » Miyamoto Shogo wrote in his diary « We finally set out to dispose of the prisoners in the late-afternoon and early-evening after numbered over 20,000, we ended up making a fatal error that took a toll in casualties among our comrades. »²⁰⁹ Tomiharu Meguro, in his diary, wrote « I was put to work shooting about 13,000 enemy soldiers. Over two days, the Yamada Unit shot nearly 20,000. It seems that all the prisoners of every unit are to be shot. »²¹⁰

Endo Takaharu, in his diary, wrote, « In the evening, in order to execute over 10,000 captives, we sent 5 soldiers ».²¹¹ While Sugeno Yoshio wrote that after the victory day parade, he « joined in gunning down the remaining 10,000 or more prisoners ».²¹² Figures that far exceed Morozumi’s.

Hague qualification inconsistencies and Foreign Reports

Using the same criteria as Tanaka, Higashinakano argues that Chinese soldiers did not meet the « qualifications » to receive Hague protections.²¹³ But Japanese Soldiers at Okinawa wouldn’t meet all of the listed stipulations relied on by Higashinakano as their command committed suicide.²¹⁴ Higashinakano’s close allies Komuro Naoki and Watanabe Shōichi wrote:

We usually hear that Japanese troops in the South Pacific died a glorious death, fighting to the last man. But in fact GIs killed almost all those who surrendered. Japanese captives who knew English were spared, to be exploited as a source of intelligence. But the rest got killed because GIs found them burdensome. The GIs slaughtered them and bulldozed the bodies into the ground. These captives may not exactly qualify as « POWs, » but the fact that they suffered this fate is duly recorded in U.S. documents.²¹⁵

In one instance, they accept moral condemnation, clearly wanting to reprimand the U.S. for war crimes, and in another, justify the execution of Chinese soldiers. But they cannot do so without abandoning Higashinakano’s bastardization of international law. Kasahara Tokushi poignantly asks if they « have been brainwashed into espousing a « masochistic » view of Japan’s past »?²¹⁶

Yoshida Yutaka, addressing Tanaka and Higashinakano, quotes multiple legal scholars of the day stating « a person who does not wear a certain military uniform or emblem, or does not take public weapons and opposes our army » could be « sentenced to death ». But « in order to punish these criminals, it is necessary to submit to a military trial and rely on the judgment. »²¹⁷ Okumiya Masatake, an Imperial Army veteran, also would contradict Higashinakano’s reasonings:

Other major powers like the U.S., Britain, France, Germany and Italy ratified the Geneva Convention. China also ratified it. Because of this, some Chinese soldiers who knew the convention must have thought that if they surrendered or were captured, they would not be killed. But if Japan killed such soldiers, what kind of excuses can there be? If soldiers have surrendered or are captured, they are POWs. It is wrong to think that soldiers in civilian clothes who have been captured are not POWs. It is wrong to think it is legitimate to kill such soldiers.²¹⁸

Strangely, in a chapter on the « requirements for prisoners-of-war status », Higashinakano discusses the killing of civilians for ten pages. His textual critiques are rather poor, for example, to refute the Routers reporter Leslie C. Smith he cites a letter from John Rabe to the Japanese Embassy on December 17th, 1937.²¹⁹ Smith gave a lecture on December 20th, 1937 in which he stated « a hundred Chinese » were killed or wounded by « stray bullets and grenades ».²²⁰ To ‘prove’ that Smith « was surely mistaken » he quotes Rabe stating « there had been very little destruction by stray [artillery] shells. »²²¹ So comparing apples with oranges.

Citing a number of select sources, Higashinakano argues that Western observers recognized that « Chinese troops (...) were not eligible to be treated as prisoners of war. »²²² First off, Higashinakano misidentifies the author of two documents and also misdates one. On January 15th, 1938 Prideaux-Brune wrote: (Higashinakano says this document was written on January 28th, 1938 and was authored by Ernest William Jeffery. Both of which are false.)

Atrocities com mitted during first two weeks after occupation of city were of a nature and on a scale which are almost incredible. Condition as regards military unruliness are slowly improving but isolated cases of murder and other barbarities continue. Within last three days houses occupied by Germans and Americans and flying respective national flags have been forcible entered by military and from one American house a Chinese was summarily removed with out consulting U.S. Embassy.²²³ (emphasized is omitted by Higashinakano)

Higashinakano then quotes another report of Prideaux-Brune (again falsely identified as Ernest William Jeffery) from January 29th, 1938 states:

Military lawlessness continues due to lack of any centralized control. Major instances are rape. [Higashinakano mistranslates “rape” as “ransacking”] Ronins (civil hangers on of army, adventurers and bravoes) have appeared on scene and are likely to prove a source of further trouble.²²⁴ (emphasized is omitted by Higashinakano)

He argues that because the report writes of « rape » as the « major » problem that would mean « the execution of regular army soldiers had [not] been in volition of international law. »²²⁵ But neither letter discusses POWs to begin with, so how can this conclusion be confidently drawn?

Higashinakano then quotes Rabe stating:

The Committee fully recognizes that identified soldiers are lawful prisoners of war. But in dealing with these disarmed soldiers, the Committee hopes that the Japanese Army will use every precaution not to involve civilians. The Committee further hopes that the Japanese Army will in accordance with the recognized laws of war regarding prisoners and for reasons of humanity exercise mercy toward these former soldiers. They might be used to good advantage as laborers and would be glad to return to civilian life if possible.²²⁶ (emphasis added)

He claims that the committee retracted this statement.²²⁷ They supposedly realized that the Chinese soldiers were not « lawful prisoners of war, » but this is false. Bates on December 26th, 1937 wrote that under international law « the lives of prisoners [of war] are to be spared except under serious military necessities » and « the Japanese [were] setting aside » the law in favor of « vengeance » for lost comrades.²²⁸ Higashinakano has no excuse for ignoring this document, as he quotes it later in his book!²²⁹ Other members of the committee also continued discussing « prisoners of war, » for example Hubert Lafayette Sone wrote:

No prisoners of war were taken here. All soldiers or those thought to be soldiers, were lined up, tied, and machine-gunned, or bayoneted. I saw several bunches being taken out in little groups, and being shot one at a time and toppled over into a dugout, and the next one just behind him stepped up and shot in his turn. I have seen scores and scores of bodies in recent days dragged out of ponds by burial societies to be buried. Many of them had their hands tied with wire, and had been burned beyond recognition. I have seen several hundred marched off at one time not to return.²³⁰ (emphasis added)

The reader should be more than capable of understanding that such a policy would be a violation of international law. The Americans knew « from reliable sources » that the Japanese were shooting « every able-bodied man capable of handling a rifle ».²³¹ Meaning the Japanese engaged in the indiscriminate « mass murder of men accused rightfully or wrongfully of being ex-soldiers. »²³² One Japanese brigade ordered « since the defeated enemy soldiers are believed to be in plainclothes, you must arrest any person who is suspected of being so and detain him at an appropriate location (...) You should regard every adult man up to middle age as a straggling or plainclothes soldier, and arrest and detain him. »²³³ Or a policy of shooting on the spot every tenth man guilty of idleness. (i.e. innocents)

The problem of burials - Charitable Organizations and Japanese Army

When did burials begin?

Higashinakano argues that the maximum number of corpses the Red Swastika Society could have buried is 15,400 and the organization was only allowed to work between February 1st and March 15th, 1938.²³⁴ Before February 1st the Japanese did not permit burials and Higashinakano argues this would mean there were no burials in December 1937 or January 1938. According to Rabe’s letter to the Japanese embassy on December 17th, 1937:

But since then any truck that appeared on the streets without a Westerner on it has been commandeered; the Red Swastika Society (working under our direction), which started trucks Tuesday morning [December 14th, 1937] to pick up dead bodies in the Zone, had its trucks either taken or attempts made to take them, and now yesterday 14 of their workers were taken away.²³⁵

To contradict this report, Higashinakano cites Rabe’s lecture, attached to his June 8th, 1938 letter to Hitler, where he said « I applied for permission to bury or move corpses from December 13th to the end of January, but this was to no avail. » On « February 1st, [1938] the corpses could finally be removed. »²³⁶ But a report by the Nanking Special Service Agency, that Higashinakano cites,²³⁷ states:

The burial corps (numbering 600 total) has been burying corpses everyday inside and outside the city, under the guidance of the [Nanking] Special Service Agency since early January. As of the end of February, approximately 5,000 corpses have been buried - a remarkable achievement.²³⁸ (emphasis added)

So, according to the report, the Red Swastika Society was working before February 1st! Another Special Service Agency document from March states « it has already been three months since the start of burial work of the [Red Swastika] Society. » As Inoue Hisashi argues, these are « confidential reports, and have no reason to lie. »²³⁹ So it’s false to claim no burials happened before February 1st, 1938.

Was the Red Swastika Society the only organization engaged in burials?

In his book, Higashinakano unambiguously declared « the only organization entrusted with burials was the Red Swastika Society (...) [and the] Ch’ung-shan-t’ang was not involved in the burials. »²⁴⁰ Both of these claims are easily proved false. Shūdō’s own sources say the opposite. Maruyama Susumu in his interview stated:

Ch’ung-shan-t’ang and other small organizations submitted their applications to the Autonomous Committee, as the Autonomous Committee had already entrusted the burial matters to the Red Swastika Society, it didn’t accept these organizations’ applications. Even these organizations engaged in the burial as subcontractors, the amount of the corpses they buried was included in the work of the Red Swastika Society.²⁴¹

If this is true, it only means other charitable organizations were subcontracted under the Red Swastika Society. Higashinakano, however, mostly overlooks this statement,²⁴² in favor of the claims of Westerners - whom he also misrepresents. Higashinakano writes that « according to Bates’ report, only the Red Swastika Society conducted burials » while « the Chinese Red Cross Society (...) was involved only with a soup kitchen. »²⁴³ It is falsely claimed that Bates « lists all the relief activities coordinated by the International Committee ». This is what Bates wrote in his report on the « Relief Situation in Nanking » (not « Refugee Problems in China »):

Our relief work is all under the International committee which organized the Nanking Safety Zone. (...) From the beginning the committee has had the excellent cooperation of the local Chinese Red Cross Society in conducting a large soup kitchen; and the cooperation of the Red Swastika Society in conducting two large soup kitchens and bury the dead bodies. This latter function has proved no small task.²⁴⁴

What is missing is the « list of all relief activities » or any reason this excludes the Red Cross Society from burials when Bates clearly recognized more organizations were involved:

Putting together information from organizations [not “an organization” - DH] interested in burying the dead and other observations, it is estimated that 10,000 persons were killed inside the walls of Nanking and about 30,000 outside the walls—this latter figure depends upon not going too far along the river bank! These people estimated that of this total about 30 percent were civilians.²⁴⁵

As for the Ch’ung-shan-t’ang, Yamamoto states: « there was no doubt that Ch’ung-shan-t’ang was involved in the burial judging from its letter addressed to a government official asking for a relief fund for its activities ».²⁴⁶ Here is the relevant letter:

To Whom It May Concern:

It has been a full month since our humble association’s burial team was established. It is a very complicated assignment, give the abnormal lack of vehicles. Now, the advent of spring has brought rising temperatures. If we do not quickly bury the remaining bodies, we fear that the exposure of the bodies on the ground will affect public health mot severely. In view of this situation, I wish to inform you that the vehicle owned by our humble association was manufactured in Year 24 [1935], and a number of it parts are now in urgent need of repair (1. electrical box) (2. piston rods) (3. clutch). With this special letter we earnestly request that your committee grant us a subsidy to complete this work. Please review this correspondence as a matter of charity, and we hope for your gracious reply.

Respectfully submitted to the Nanjing Self-Government Committee.

Zhou Yiyu, Leader, Nanjing Chongshan Benevolent Association Burial Team (seal).²⁴⁷

While the Ch’ung-shan-t’ang were engaged in burials, their burial statistics are unreliable.²⁴⁸

How many corpses were buried?

Higashinakano estimates that « the maximum number of bodies buried in Nanking was approximately 13,000-15,000. »²⁴⁹ He reaches this estimate by stating burials began in February and ended in mid-March 1938. As mentioned, we know burials began before February 1st, 1938, but Higashinakano’s belief that burials ended in March is as spurious. Minnie Vautrin recorded that Red Swastika Society continued its work in mid-April.²⁵⁰ So objections on this basis are null.

Higashinakano also exploits discrepancies in the Red Swastika Society statistics where there are huge insertions like 6,468 bodies in a single day.²⁵¹ Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi suggested these resulted from a « recorder having combin[ing] several days’ or weeks’ burial in one entry. »²⁵² The statistics seem to roughly corroborate this assertion. (See Red Swastika Society’s burial statistics)

A more damning contradiction would be that the Nanking Special Service Agency reported the Red Swastika Society only buried 5,000 corpses by the end of February,²⁵³ while the Red Swastika Society Statistics suggest they buried 30,382. Ignored is the plausible explanation that these « discrepancies possibly occurred because the Red Swastika Society initially counted only the result of its own burial work, but later included the tallies from other organizations. »²⁵⁴ The Red Cross Society buried some 17,907 corpses by the end of February and the Nanking Special Service Agency report wouldn’t include the Red Swastika Society’s December burials - 7,247.²⁵⁵ This would even out to 5,228 bodies the Red Swastika Society buried by the end of February. On March 1st, 1938 the Nanking Special Service Agency reported the Red Swastika Society buried 31,791 corpses. If we exclude December burials from outside the city walls the Red Swastika Society Statistics are roughly equal.

This should not surprise anyone, as Maruyama Susumu stated the « Ch’ung-shan-t’ang and other small organizations » work was « included in the work of the Red Swastika Society ». Minnie Vautrin’s diary entry of April 15th, 1938 also corroborates these reports.²⁵⁶ So the evidence seems overwhelming that the Red Swastika Society, and other organizations, buried some 43,000 corpses.

Kuomintang, Chinese Communist Party, & Miner Searle Bates: Faulty Textual Criticism

Higashinakano discovered that Timperley inserted two passages into Miner Searle Bates letters that were reproduced in What war means: the Japanese terror in China. These are (a) « Burial gangs report three thousand bodies at that point » and (b) « Evidence from burials indicate that close to forty thousand unarmed persons were killed within and near the walls of Nanking, of whom some 30 per cent had never been soldiers. »²⁵⁷ He however extrapolates this to mean the Republic of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs ‘deleted’ these passages because they were untrue.²⁵⁸

Reviewing correspondence between Timperley and Bates would, possibly, suggest these insertions were made at Bates’ suggestion sometime after the Red Swastika Societies burial figure became know.²⁵⁹ To extrapolate, as Higashinakano does, would require a statement from Hsü Shuhsi that the « deletions » were due to the claims being « false ». Which we do not have.²⁶⁰ These volumes were based on the original documents, not Timperley’s version, thus explaining its exclusion in a non-conspiratorial way.

Higashinakano then uses the 1938 Chinese Yearbook, which he assumes to have been published in February 1938.²⁶¹ If the Nanking massacre happened, a « special entry referring to [Nanking outrages] would certainly have been included in the 1938 edition », since « no entry » existed then no massacre happened.²⁶² First off, this is only when the Chinese Yearbook was finalized, as production was « delayed » well past February because of the Japanese invasion starting at Shanghai. Second, this shows a grave misunderstanding of how works like the Chinese Yearbook are produced. Manuscripts were finished in late-November or early-December while the city was captured on December 13th, 1937. Given these circumstances, one « cannot reasonably expect a detailed narrative of the Atrocity in the Yearbook ».²⁶³ For example, the 1938 Chinese Yearbook being silent on how many died on the USS Panay on December 12th doesn’t mean no one died on it and the very brief passage about the Japanese occupation of Nanking is the most detailed one could expect at the time.

We further discover the massacre was never discussed in any official capacity:

There was no mention of a “Nanking Massacre” in a resolution issued by the League of Nations a month later, on May 27, nor in a lecture entitled “On Protracted War” delivered by Mao Zedong over a period of nine days, commencing on May 26. Nor was it mentioned in Chiang Kai-shek’s statements to friendly nations and to the Japanese people sent on July 7, or in special issues of English-language magazines commemorating the first anniversary of the Second Sino-Japanese War published in Shanghai.

The “Nanking Massacre” remained unacknowledged. Furthermore, the claim that it had occurred had been dismissed by numerous official statements and records.²⁶⁴ (emphasis added)

The majority of this is a weak argument from silence. That Churchill, Eisenhower, de Gaulle didn’t mention homicidal gas chambers doesn’t mean the Holocaust never happened! It’s simply fallacious.²⁶⁵ Statements, reports and treatises have their own objectives and purposes and, as Inoue Hisashi has argued, « It is reasonable for even elementary school students to understand that the fact that the Nanjing Massacre was not directly mentioned in the texts collected, by ignoring them, does not prove that there was no Nanjing Massacre. » But, were Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party silent during and shortly after the massacre? On January 1st, 1938 the Chinese Communist Party published a statement in Ch’ün-chung (Spring), titled « Rage Against Enemy Atrocities Based on Human Justice ». It denounced the « bloody brutality [that was] unprecedented in human history »:

There has been bloody brutality unprecedented in human history in the areas of Nanjing and Shanghai, especially the great massacre in the city of Nanjing. This is not only a declaration of war against the entire Chinese nation, but also a declaration of war against all humanity. The enemy’s ferocious cruelty will inevitably be avenged by humanity and justice, and will evoke the wrath and loathing of the entire world and all humankind.²⁶⁶

While a Kuomintang newspaper on February 14th, 1938 stated that the Japanese army had « stolen the blood of 200,000 compatriots. »²⁶⁷ March 10th, 1938 the KMT broadcasted a report entitled the « Barbaric Acts by the Imperial Army » that repeated reports of atrocities published in Hankow Ta-kung-pao.²⁶⁸ What of Higashinakano’s interpretation of Chiang Kai-shek’s statement? Higashinakano writes:

On July 7, 1938, Chiang Kai-shek delivered “The Generalissimo’s Statement to Friendly Nations” and “The Generalissimo’s Statement to the Japanese People.” A good part of each statement was devoted to a denunciation of “Japanese atrocities.” (...) When one reads through these statements looking for a reference to Japanese atrocities in Nanking, one notices that Chiang mentions nothing about a Nanking Massacre. The atrocities he describes allegedly occurred in Guangdong.²⁶⁹

This is what Chiang Kai-shek wrote:

Do you know that your soldiers are already the most barbaric and most cruel force in the world? The “Yamato-damashii” and the “Bushido” that your country is proud of have already disappeared. Whenever your troops occupy a district, it is difficult for innocent civilians and wounded soldiers to escape the arson and plunder; Each time, they commit a massive massacre. (…)

The one thing that I cannot bear to say is that it is an assault on my fellow girls and women. From girls around the age of ten to old women aged fifty or sixty, once they are captured, the entire family is unable to escape. In some cases, a few people were humiliated one after another, and the victims groaned and lost their lives without a chance to escape, and in other cases, dozens of women, including mothers and daughters, sisters, and daughters-in-law were stripped naked and killed.

Take Canton, [Guangdong] for instance. That city has been attacked from the air day and night during the last fortnight. Thousands of civilians have been killed. Their blood and flesh sputtered with the splinters of their houses where the infernal machines raged. Foreign officials and civilians who personally witnessed the appalling scenes have written reports and made motion pictures thereof illustrating the unprecedented cruelty committed by the barbarous Japanese in China. If such acts of extreme barbarity, committed under pretence of civilization, should be left unpunished, there would be no more equity and justice in this world. This is an ineffaceable blot on the history of mankind. (…) This military is not only a disgrace to Japan, but also a stain on its people. (...) ²⁷⁰ (Bold mine and emphasized is omitted by Higashinakano)

Chiang Kai-shek does not name Nanking, but clearly mentions what happened there. Higashinakano argues the atrocities « allegedly occurred in Guangdong, » but it’s only condemned as an indiscriminate bombing - before it was the reference to « massive massacre ». As Yoshida Takashi states « there is little doubt about the area to which » Chiang Kai-shek was « referring, since no huge-scale atrocities of the type he mentions had yet been reported elsewhere in China. »²⁷¹ Chiang Kai-shek wrote in his diary on January 12, 1938: « The Japanese army is carrying out endless murder and adultery. This assault, which resembles a beast, is, of course, hastening their own destruction. Even so, the pain of the compatriots has reached its extreme. »²⁷²

So, what about Mao? Here’s what Higashinakano has to say:

Nor did Mao Zedong make any mention of a Nanking Massacre in his famous lecture entitled On Protracted War (...) In Mao’s opinion, the Japanese could have exterminated Chinese soldiers trapped within the city walls, but did not do so. Note that he did not accuse the Japanese military of violating international law - of perpetrating a massacre in Nanking.²⁷³

Addressing this point, Inoue Hisashi wrote:

Mao Zedong gave a lecture on “Protracted War” from late May to early June, so it may be a wonder whether Mao had been informed of the Nanjing Massacre at that time. However, it is a completely different issue from “Mao Zedong knew that there was no Nanjing Massacre.”²⁷⁴

In fact, the same Yenan Study Association - which published Mao’s speech - started publishing a Current Issue Series in 1939. The third volume, Japanese Atrocities in the Occupied Areas, is relevant, as it contains a Chapter « Japanese Atrocities in Central China » with the first section being « In Nanjing ». It contains several records of the International Committee of the Nanking Safety Zone.²⁷⁵ Inoue Hisashi further states:

The preamble to the book is written by Mao Zedong, dated January 1st, 1939. The preamble entitled ‘Studying the Occupied Areas,’ in short, is that from the standpoint of “no survey, no right to speak”. This collection of materials is used to study the situation of the occupied territories of the Japanese Army. It can be seen from here that Mao Zedong himself should not have been unaware of the Nanjing massacre.²⁷⁶

He suggests that Higashinakano had simply looked up Nanking in the index in The Collection of Historical Materials on the Communist Party of China (Volume 9) and found « On Protracted War » and General Xiang Ying’s Speech. This seems likely, as Inoue Hisashi and Yoshida Takashi both quote from multiple « official sources, » which do not « dismiss » the claim of a massacre.²⁷⁷ Higashinakano quotes the League of Nations resolution of May 27th, 1938.²⁷⁸ By doing so, he ignores that Koo Wei-Jun (Washington Koo) on February 2nd, 1938, condemned the Japanese’s « cruel and barbarous conduct » in Nanking and elsewhere. Koo Wei-Jun would go on to accuse the Japanese of « wholesale looting, violation of women, murder of civilians, eviction of Chinese from their homes, mass execution of war prisoners, and the impression of able-bodied men. »

Seventeen days before the resolution cited by Higashinakano, Koo Wei-Jun would further accuse the Japanese:

The wanton slaughter of noncombatants by the indiscriminate bombing of undefended towns and nonmilitary centers has been continuing unabated. The unprecedented violence to women and ruthlessness to children and the deliberate massacre of hundreds of adult males amongst the civilian population, including those removed from refugee camps under false pretenses, form the subject of many reports by impartial foreign eyewitnesses. The cruel and barbarous conduct of Japanese troops towards the Chinese people in the occupied areas not only shows the want of regard on the part of the Japanese army for the accepted rules of warfare, but also betrays a disgraceful lack of discipline in rank and file.²⁷⁹

Despite such statements, Higashinakano falsely claims that there is not « any evidence that a protest relating to the “Nanking Massacre” (…) was ever submitted to the League of Nations. » For Chinese leaders and Koo Wei-Jun Nanking was part of a wider series of atrocities against the Chinese population. The massacre was discussed in the League of Nations alongside allegations of « indiscriminate bombardment of open towns » - which Koo emphasized 17 provinces had experienced - and the employment of chemical weapons by the Japanese military.²⁸⁰

1. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp.90 It should be noted that it’s unclear whether Yamamoto’s figures are accurate. While he accepts a garrison force of 110,000-130,000 he provides a list of sources ranging between 35,000-150,000. (Ibid pp.47) David Askew has argued convincingly that the garrison force totaled 73,790-81,500. His final conclusion that the population totaled 273,790-331,500 is suspect, as will be explained later in this review.

2. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp.109-10, 114 David Askew, “Part of the Numbers Issue: Demography and Civilian Victims.” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 112 Lewis S. C. Smythe conducted a study on War Damage in the Nanking area Dec. 1937 to Mar. 1938 and suggested, with his college Miner Searle Bates, that “the number of civilians killed in Nanking was 12,000”. It is worth noting that Smythe’s study extrapolated a death toll of some 2,400 males but contained many faults, as documented by Kasahara Tokushi. If properly interpreted Smythe’s results should "yield over 38,870 civilian massacre victims". (ibid pp. 375)

3. Lewis S. C. Smythe’s War Damage in the Nanking Area, December, 1937 to March 1938: Urban and Rural Surveys. Shanghai: Printed by the Mercury Press, 1938. states that “rape to the extent of 8 per cent of all females of 16-50 years”. This would translate roughly to 4,000-5,000 rapes, but Smythe notes “[t]his figure is a serious under-statement, since most women who suffered such treatment would not volunteer the information, nor would their male relatives.” From this, we can suggest the actual number was two to three times higher (8,000-15,000), a figure that’s supported by contemporary estimates. Miner Searle Bates has stated, “Many thousands of women were raped (8,000 was a careful figure set early in the process, and the most conservative given by an observer).” Kaiyuan Zhang, Eyewitnesses to Massacre: American Missionaries Bear Witness to Japanese Atrocities in Nanjing. Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 2001. pp. 42. Oskar Trautmann, the German ambassador to China, estimated that 20,000 women were raped. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 136

4. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 254

5. Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi “Leftover Problems” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 338-9

6. Takashi Yoshida, The Making of the “rape of Nanking”: History and Memory in Japan, China, and the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. pp. 50-2.

7. Nakajima Takeshi, ‘The Tokyo Tribunal, Justice Pal and the Revisionist Distortion of History,’ The Asia-Pacific Journal Vol 9, Issue 44 No 3, October 31, 2011.

8. Masaaki Tanaka, What Really Happened in Nanking: The Refutation of a Common Myth. Tokyo: Sekai shuppan, Inc, 2000. pp. 5.

9. Neil Boister and Robert Cryer, Documents on the Tokyo International Military Tribunal: Charter, Indictment and Judgments. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. pp. 1299, 1302.

10. Neil Boister and Robert Cryer, Documents on the Tokyo International Military Tribunal: Charter, Indictment and Judgments. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. pp. 1354.

11. Neil Boister and Robert Cryer, Documents on the Tokyo International Military Tribunal: Charter, Indictment and Judgments. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. pp. 1343-4.

12. Neil Boister and Robert Cryer, Documents on the Tokyo International Military Tribunal: Charter, Indictment and Judgments. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. pp. 1359.

13. Takashi Yoshida, The Making of the “rape of Nanking”: History and Memory in Japan, China, and the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. pp. 50-2.

14. Nakajima Takeshi, ‘The Tokyo Tribunal, Justice Pal and the Revisionist Distortion of History,’ The Asia-Pacific Journal Vol 9, Issue 44 No 3, October 31, 2011.

15. Takashi Yoshida, “A Battle over History” in Joshua A. Fogel, The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. pp. 87-8.

16. Masaaki Tanaka, What Really Happened in Nanking: The Refutation of a Common Myth. Tokyo: Sekai shuppan, Inc, 2000. pp. 130 fn.7.

17. Cheng Zhaoqi, “Was the Nanking Massacre a Fabrication of the Tokyo Trial?” in The Tokyo Trial: Recollections and Perspectives from China. Cambridge University Press, 2016. pp. 19.

18. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 243.

19. Takashi Yoshida, The Making of the “rape of Nanking”: History and Memory in Japan, China, and the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. pp. 98.

20. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 242.

21. Takashi Yoshida, The Making of the “rape of Nanking”: History and Memory in Japan, China, and the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. pp. 98.

22. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 242-3.

23. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 274 fn. 31.

24. Hora Tomio, Nankin daigyakusatsu no shōmei, Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1986.

25. Takashi Yoshida, The Making of the “rape of Nanking”: History and Memory in Japan, China, and the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. pp. 176-7.

26. Takashi Yoshida, The Making of the “rape of Nanking”: History and Memory in Japan, China, and the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. pp. 176.

27. Kasahara Tokushi, “Higashinakano Osamichi: The Last Word in Denial” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 312-15.

28. Kasahara Tokushi, “Higashinakano Osamichi: The Last Word in Denial” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 309.

29. Kasahara Tokushi, “Higashinakano Osamichi: The Last Word in Denial” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 316.

30. Takashi Yoshida, “A Battle over History” in Joshua A. Fogel, The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. pp. 106-7.

31. Kasahara Tokushi, “Higashinakano Osamichi: The Last Word in Denial” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 316.

32. “Unable or unwilling to understand that – as every historian and trial judge knows – witnesses can be dead wrong about a great many details of events they describe (especially when it comes to highly violent, traumatic events) without this meaning that they are wrong about the events themselves, and that inaccuracies about numbers, measurements, technical mechanisms and other details in an eyewitness testimony merely mean that this testimony cannot be taken at face value and may be used only insofar as corroborated by other evidence, Hitler’s willing defense attorneys often indulge in lengthy pleas against the testimonies of incriminating witnesses.” Holocaust Controversies: The oh-so-unreliable Rudolf Reder

33. Masaaki Tanaka, What Really Happened in Nanking: The Refutation of a Common Myth. Tokyo: Sekai shuppan, Inc, 2000. pp. 7.

34. Jenin: The Truth - The Washington Post

35. Hillel Cohen, Year Zero of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1929. Brandeis University Press, 2015. pp. 129.

36. Jacques Sémelin, Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide. Hurst & Company, 2007. pp. 4.

37. Tomislav Dulić, Utopias of Nation: Local Mass Killing in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1941-42. Uppsala University Uppsala Universitet 2005. pp. 22.

38. Massacre | Sciences Po Violence de masse et Résistance - Réseau de recherche

39. Jerry Keenan, The Terrible Indian Wars of the West: a History from the Whitman Massacre to Wounded Knee, 1846-1890. McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2016. pp. 8.

40. Robert Melson, “A Theoretical Inquiry into the Armenian Massacres of 1894–1896.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 24.3, 1982. pp. 482-3.

41. Will Coster, “Massacre and codes of conduct in the English civil war”, in Mark Levene and Penny Roberts. The Massacre in History. New York: Berghahn Books, 1999. pp. 90.

42. Higashinakano Shudo. The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 144.

43. Philip G. Dwyer and Lyndall Ryan, Theatres of Violence: Massacre, Mass Killing, and Atrocity throughout History. Berghahn Books, 2015. pp. xiii.

44. Jerry Keenan, The Wagon Box Fight: an Episode of Red Cloud’s War. Perseus Books Group, 2000.

45. Eliezer Tauber argues, “[t]here is a crucial difference between killing people in battle and a massacre. With the exception of certain incidents as detailed above, people in Deir Yassin were killed, not massacred.” Eliezer Tauber, The Massacre That Never Was: The Myth of Deir Yassin and the Creation of the Palestinian Refugee Problem. ASMEA, 2021. pp. 226-7. However, Tauber’s book does not explore what constitutes a massacre. Based on Tauber’s accounting, Deir Yassin seems to meet many of the criteria of the provided definitions. 101 people died, 60 were below the age of 14, and only 24 were active combatants. 23 were not killed in combat. 11 of the Zaydan family were lined up in front of their house and machine-gunned by Irgun. 6 men were potentially taken, post-hostilities, and executed in the village’s rock quarries. In contradiction to his description of the killing of the Zaydan family, Tauber asserts, “[t]here were no incidents in which families were stood against walls and shot to death.”

At times, Tauber’s numbers feel problematic. Based on an extrapolation from a genealogical chart from Kana’na & Zaytawi’s study, he estimates the population of Dier Yassin at 1000. Even though the 1944 Mandatory Census and a request from the Arab National Committee of Jerusalem for financial assistance for survivors contradict his estimate, it seems the Irgun and Lehi inflicted a higher percentage of casualties than Tauber suggests.

If Dier Yassin was not a massacre, it would raise similar questions as to whether comparable atrocities like the Hadassah medical convoy or Kfar Etzion in April and May 1948 were massacres or not.

46. Masaaki Tanaka, What Really Happened in Nanking: The Refutation of a Common Myth. Tokyo: Sekai shuppan, Inc, 2000. pp. 13-4.

47. Hata Ikuhito, “The Nanking Atrocities: Fact and Fable.” Japan Echo, August 1998.

48. David Askew, “Part of the Numbers Issue: Demography and Civilian Victims.” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 91.

49. David Askew, “Part of the Numbers Issue: Demography and Civilian Victims.” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 96.

50. Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi “Leftover Problems” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. p. 376 Wakabayashi notes that Rabe originally estimated the population at 1,350,000 million in July 1937 and on December 6th that 800,000 fled. This would suggest a population of 550,000. He also cites that Smythe stated the population in early November 1937 was 500,000. Even if we assume mass exodus, “Kasahara stresses, refugees fled into the city from the east, and their number may have approached that of those who left earlier.”

51. Zhang Xianwen, et al. A History of the Nanking Massacre. Cengage Learning Asia Pte Ltd, 2019. pp. 42.

52. David Askew, ‘Defending Nanking: An Examination of the Capital Garrison Forces’, Sino-Japanese Studies, vol. 15, 2003, pp. 148-73.

53. These figures were generated by combining Askew’s population estimate of 217,000-235,000 civilians with Yamamoto’s estimate that 44,000-104,000 soldiers survived the battle of Nanking.

54. David Askew, “Part of the Numbers Issue: Demography and Civilian Victims.” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 96. Lewis S. Smythe and Searle M. Bates. War Damage in the Nanking Area: December, 1937 to March, 1938. On Behalf of The Nanking International Relief Committee, 1938. Table 1 fn.

55. Masaaki Tanaka, What Really Happened in Nanking: The Refutation of a Common Myth. Tokyo: Sekai shuppan, Inc, 2000. pp. 16.

56. January 17th, 1938 diary entry: “Estimates of the total population of the Zone are now around 250,000. The increase of about 50,000 came from the ruined parts of the city. People simply don’t know where to stay.” John Rabe and Erwin Wickert. The Good Man of Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1998. pp. 135.

57. Masaaki Tanaka, What Really Happened in Nanking: The Refutation of a Common Myth. Tokyo: Sekai shuppan, Inc, 2000. pp. 19.

58. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 129.

59. Cheng Zhaoqi, “Was the Nanking Massacre a Fabrication of the Tokyo Trial?” in The Tokyo Trial: Recollections and Perspectives from China. Cambridge University Press, 2016. pp. 20.

60. Suping Lu, The 1937 - 1938 Nanjing Atrocities. Springer Singapore, 2019. pp. 209.

61. Neil Boister and Robert Cryer, Documents on the Tokyo International Military Tribunal: Charter, Indictment and Judgments. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. pp. 1358.

62. Masaaki Tanaka, What Really Happened in Nanking: The Refutation of a Common Myth. Tokyo: Sekai shuppan, Inc, 2000. pp. 18.

63. Why do some people refuse to evacuate during a hurricane? For the same reasons people don’t listen to warnings they should save money. - The Washington Post

64. Masaaki Tanaka, What Really Happened in Nanking: The Refutation of a Common Myth. Tokyo: Sekai shuppan, Inc, 2000. pp. 20-1.

65. (NMP0145) The Nanking Massacre Archival Project: Documents | Yale University Library

66. Zhang, Xianwen, et al. A History of the Nanking Massacre. Cengage Learning Asia Pte Ltd, 2019. pp. 124-37.

67. Masaaki Tanaka, What Really Happened in Nanking: The Refutation of a Common Myth. Tokyo: Sekai shuppan, Inc, 2000. pp. 21. The full quote is “Professor Smythe and I concluded, as a result of our investigations and observations and checking of burials, that twelve thousand civilians, men, women and children, were killed inside the walls within our own sure knowledge. There were many others killed within the city outside our knowledge whose numbers we have no way of checking, and also there were large numbers killed immediately outside the city, of civilians. This is quite apart from the killing of tens of thousands of men who were Chinese soldiers or had been Chinese soldiers.” Suping Lu, They Were in Nanjing: The Nanjing Massacre Witnessed by American and British Nationals. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004. pp. 281.

68. Masaaki Tanaka, What Really Happened in Nanking: The Refutation of a Common Myth. Tokyo: Sekai shuppan, Inc, 2000. pp. 22.

69. Suping Lu, The 1937 - 1938 Nanjing Atrocities. Springer Singapore, 2019. pp. 232.

70. Suping Lu, The 1937 - 1938 Nanjing Atrocities. Springer Singapore, 2019. pp. 283.

71. Suping Lu, The 1937 - 1938 Nanjing Atrocities. Springer Singapore, 2019. pp. 45.

72. Kaiyuan Zhang, Eyewitnesses to Massacre: American Missionaries Bear Witness to Japanese Atrocities in Nanjing. Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 2001. pp. 42.

73. Masaaki Tanaka, What Really Happened in Nanking: The Refutation of a Common Myth. Tokyo: Sekai shuppan, Inc, 2000. pp. 26.

74. Cheng Zhaoqi, “Was the Nanking Massacre a Fabrication of the Tokyo Trial?” in The Tokyo Trial: Recollections and Perspectives from China. Cambridge University Press, 2016. pp. 45-48.

75. Suping Lu, The 1937 - 1938 Nanjing Atrocities. Springer Singapore, 2019. pp. 208.

76. Cheng Zhaoqi, “Was the Nanking Massacre a Fabrication of the Tokyo Trial?” in The Tokyo Trial: Recollections and Perspectives from China. Cambridge University Press, 2016. pp. 47.

77. Fujiwara Akira, “The Nanking Atrocity: An Interpretive Overview” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. p.41-2 Fujiwara’s translation is “There is no need to send them to the rear for confinement and wait to see how the war situation changes - as we would do with nationals of other [Western] powers. In the absence of special circumstances, it is alright to release them on the spot or to transport them elsewhere for release. The Chinese’ domicile registration system is full of defects, and most Chinese soldiers are the scum of society, so there is little way for anyone to check whether they are alive or where they are. Thus, even if you were to kill them or release them elsewhere, no one will broach the issue.”

78. Masaaki Tanaka, What Really Happened in Nanking: The Refutation of a Common Myth. Tokyo: Sekai shuppan, Inc, 2000. pp. 43.

79. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 139. For a slightly different translation, see Kasahara Tokushi’s “Remembering the Nanking Massacre” in Fei Fei Li, Robert Sabella, and David Liu. Nanking 1937: Memory and Healing. Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 2002. pp. 79.

80. IHL Treaties - Hague Convention (IV) on War on Land and its Annexed Regulations, 1907 (icrc.org)

81. Masaaki Tanaka, What Really Happened in Nanking: The Refutation of a Common Myth. Tokyo: Sekai shuppan, Inc, 2000. pp. 43-4.

82. James Brown Scott, The Proceeding of the Hague Peace conferences 1899. Oxford University Press, 1920, pp. 60.

83. Thomas Erskine Holland, The Laws and Customs of War on Land, as Defined by the Hague Convention of 1899. Harrison and Sons, 1904, pp. 15.

84. Thomas Erskine Holland, The Laws and Customs of War on Land, as Defined by the Hague Convention of 1899. Harrison and Sons, 1904, pp. 45.

85. John Rabe and Erwin Wickert. The Good Man of Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1998. pp. 145-6.

86. 立作太郎『戦時国際法論』 (xrea.com)

87. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 110.

88. Masaaki Tanaka, What Really Happened in Nanking: The Refutation of a Common Myth. Tokyo: Sekai shuppan, Inc, 2000. pp. 45.

89. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 94, 245. For the full entry, see Suping Lu, The 1937 - 1938 Nanjing Atrocities. Springer Singapore, 2019. pp. 218.

90. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 105. Ono Kenji, “Massacre near Mufushan” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 76.

91. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 102.

92. Ono Kenji, “Massacre near Mufushan” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 76. Yamada quote from Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 102.

93. Suping Lu, The 1937 - 1938 Nanjing Atrocities. Springer Singapore, 2019. pp. 212.

94. Ono Kenji, “Massacre near Mufushan” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 77-8.

95. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 103.

96. Masaaki Tanaka, What Really Happened in Nanking: The Refutation of a Common Myth. Tokyo: Sekai shuppan, Inc, 2000. pp. 48.

97. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 103. Ono Kenji, “Massacre near Mufushan” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 74.

98. Suping Lu, The 1937 - 1938 Nanjing Atrocities. Springer Singapore, 2019. pp. 212-17.

99. Ono Kenji, “Massacre near Mufushan” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 78.

100. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 103.

101. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp.104-5. Yamamoto plays to both sides and doesn’t come to a definitive conclusion. It’s recommended that the reader turn to Ono Kenji’s account.

102. Ono Kenji, “Massacre near Mufushan” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 79.

103. Ono Kenji, “Massacre near Mufushan” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 81.

104. Lewis S. Smythe and Searle M. Bates. War Damage in the Nanking Area: December, 1937 to March, 1938. On Behalf of The Nanking International Relief Committee, 1938. Table 2. & pp. 22.

105. Suping Lu, The 1937 - 1938 Nanjing Atrocities. Springer Singapore, 2019. pp. 494.

106. Suping Lu, The 1937 - 1938 Nanjing Atrocities. Springer Singapore, 2019. pp. 498.

107. Takashi Yoshida, “Wartime Accounts of the Nanking Atrocity” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 251.

108. Suping Lu, The 1937 - 1938 Nanjing Atrocities. Springer Singapore, 2019. Chapter 9.

109. Zhang, Xianwen, et al. A History of the Nanking Massacre. Cengage Learning Asia Pte Ltd, 2019. pp. 362-367.

110. Cheng Zhaoqi, “Was the Nanking Massacre a Fabrication of the Tokyo Trial?” in The Tokyo Trial: Recollections and Perspectives from China. Cambridge University Press, 2016. pp. 25.

111. John Rabe and Erwin Wickert. The Good Man of Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1998. pp. 185.

112. Cheng Zhaoqi, “Was the Nanking Massacre a Fabrication of the Tokyo Trial?” in The Tokyo Trial: Recollections and Perspectives from China. Cambridge University Press, 2016. pp. 28-30.

113. Masaaki Tanaka, What Really Happened in Nanking: The Refutation of a Common Myth. Tokyo: Sekai shuppan, Inc, 2000. pp. 68.

114. Nanjing Massacre evidence twisted at historian’s whim | The Japan Times

115. Masahiro Yamamoto, “A Tale of Two Atrocities”, in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 296.

116. Hata Ikuhito, “The Nanking Atrocities: Fact and Fable.” Japan Echo, August 1998, pp. 47-57 Joshua A. Fogel, Review, The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 57, no. 3, 1998, pp. 818–820. Charles Burress, Wars of Memory, The San Francisco Chronicle, July 26, 1998. Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi “Iris Chang Reassessed” in Wakabayashi, Bob T. The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938: Complicating the Picture. New York, NY: Berghahn Books, Incorporated, 2017. Also see Timothy M. Kelly’s review.

117. Takemoto Tadao, and Ohara Yasuo. The Alleged ‘Nanking Massacre’: Japan’s Rebuttal to China’s Forged Claims. Tokyo: Meisei-sha, Inc, 2000. pp. 8, 12.

118. Masaaki Tanaka, What Really Happened in Nanking: The Refutation of a Common Myth. Tokyo: Sekai shuppan, Inc, 2000. pp. 110-27.

119. Takemoto Tadao, and Ohara Yasuo. The Alleged ‘Nanking Massacre’: Japan’s Rebuttal to China’s Forged Claims. Tokyo: Meisei-sha, Inc, 2000. pp. 98-105.

120. Psychological Warfare – The Nanking Massacre (wordpress.com) On Japanese censorship see Cheng Zhaoqi, “Was the Nanking Massacre a Fabrication of the Tokyo Trial?” in The Tokyo Trial: Recollections and Perspectives from China. Cambridge University Press, 2016. pp.24-34 and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, “The Nanking 100-Man Killing Contest Debate: War Guilt amid Fabricated Illusions, 1971-75.” Journal of Japanese Studies, vol. 26, no. 2, 2000, p. 326, 336.

121. The Nanking Massacre Project: Photographs and Films | Yale University Library

122. Takemoto Tadao, and Ohara Yasuo. The Alleged ‘Nanking Massacre’: Japan’s Rebuttal to China’s Forged Claims. Tokyo: Meisei-sha, Inc, 2000. pp. 58, 60.

123. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 84.

124. Takemoto Tadao, and Ohara Yasuo. The Alleged ‘Nanking Massacre’: Japan’s Rebuttal to China’s Forged Claims. Tokyo: Meisei-sha, Inc, 2000. pp. 58-9.

125. Suping Lu, The 1937 - 1938 Nanjing Atrocities. Springer Singapore, 2019. pp. 293-4.

126. Suping Lu, A Dark Page in History: The Nanjing Massacre and Post-Massacre Social Conditions Recorded in British Diplomatic Dispatches, Admiralty Documents, and U.S. Naval Intelligence Reports. Lanham: Hamilton Books, 2018. pp. 154.

127. Lewis S. Smythe and Searle M. Bates. War Damage in the Nanking Area: December, 1937 to March, 1938. On Behalf of The Nanking International Relief Committee, 1938. pp. I.

128. Takemoto Tadao, and Ohara Yasuo. The Alleged ‘Nanking Massacre’: Japan’s Rebuttal to China’s Forged Claims. Tokyo: Meisei-sha, Inc, 2000. pp. 83-4.

129. (NMP0145) The Nanking Massacre Archival Project: Documents | Yale University Library

130. Suping Lu, The 1937 - 1938 Nanjing Atrocities. Springer Singapore, 2019. pp. 127.

131. Suping Lu, The 1937 - 1938 Nanjing Atrocities. Springer Singapore, 2019. pp. 127.

132. Suping Lu, The 1937 - 1938 Nanjing Atrocities. Springer Singapore, 2019. pp. 222.

133. Lewis S. Smythe and Searle M. Bates. War Damage in the Nanking Area: December, 1937 to March, 1938. On Behalf of The Nanking International Relief Committee, 1938. pp. II.

134. Takemoto Tadao, and Ohara Yasuo. The Alleged ‘Nanking Massacre’: Japan’s Rebuttal to China’s Forged Claims. Tokyo: Meisei-sha, Inc, 2000. pp. 86.

135. Takemoto Tadao, and Ohara Yasuo. The Alleged ‘Nanking Massacre’: Japan’s Rebuttal to China’s Forged Claims. Tokyo: Meisei-sha, Inc, 2000. pp. 91-2.

136. Kasahara Tokushi, “Higashinakano Osamichi: The Last Word in Denial” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 332.

137. EX-CHINESE OFFICERS AMONG U.S. REFUGEES; Colonel and His Aides Admit Blaming the Japanese for Crimes in Nanking - The New York Times (nytimes.com)

138. Suping Lu, The 1937 - 1938 Nanjing Atrocities. Springer Singapore, 2019. pp. 229, 234.

139. Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, “The Nanking Massacre: Now You See It, . . .” Monumenta Nipponica, vol. 56, no. 4, 2001, pp. 528.

140. Daqing Yang “The Challenges of the Nanjing Massacre: Reflection on Historical Inquiry” in Joshua A. Fogel, The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. pp. 150-1.

141. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 118 fn.25.

142. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 67.

143. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 24, 139-40.

144. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 144.

145. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 140.

146. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 140.

147. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 142.

148. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 143.

149. Cheng Zhaoqi, The Nanjing Massacre and Sino-Japanese Relations: Examining the Japanese ‘illusion’ School. Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. pp. 123. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 93.

150. Takemoto Tadao, and Ohara Yasuo. The Alleged ‘Nanking Massacre’: Japan’s Rebuttal to China’s Forged Claims. Tokyo: Meisei-sha, Inc, 2000. pp. 77.

151. Takemoto Tadao, and Ohara Yasuo. The Alleged ‘Nanking Massacre’: Japan’s Rebuttal to China’s Forged Claims. Tokyo: Meisei-sha, Inc, 2000. pp. 77.

152. Takemoto Tadao, and Ohara Yasuo. The Alleged ‘Nanking Massacre’: Japan’s Rebuttal to China’s Forged Claims. Tokyo: Meisei-sha, Inc, 2000. pp. 75.

153. Zhang, Xianwen, et al. A History of the Nanking Massacre. Cengage Learning Asia Pte Ltd, 2019. pp. 94.

154. Cheng Zhaoqi, The Nanjing Massacre and Sino-Japanese Relations: Examining the Japanese ‘illusion’ School. Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. pp. 123. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 126.

155. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 108.

156. Zhang, Xianwen, et al. A History of the Nanking Massacre. Cengage Learning Asia Pte Ltd, 2019. pp. 92-3. Fujiwara Akira, “The Nanking Atrocity: An Interpretive Overview” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 44.

157. Suping Lu, The 1937 - 1938 Nanjing Atrocities. Springer Singapore, 2019. pp. 226.

158. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 94.

159. Kasahara Tokushi, “Massacres outside Nanking City” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 65.

160. John Rabe and Erwin Wickert. The Good Man of Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1998. pp. 68.

161. Takemoto Tadao, and Ohara Yasuo. The Alleged ‘Nanking Massacre’: Japan’s Rebuttal to China’s Forged Claims. Tokyo: Meisei-sha, Inc, 2000. pp. 79.

162. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 129.

163. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 159.

164. Fujiwara Akira, “The Nanking Atrocity: An Interpretive Overview” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 36, 41.

165. Takemoto Tadao, and Ohara Yasuo. The Alleged ‘Nanking Massacre’: Japan’s Rebuttal to China’s Forged Claims. Tokyo: Meisei-sha, Inc, 2000. pp. 64.

166. Takemoto Tadao, and Ohara Yasuo. The Alleged ‘Nanking Massacre’: Japan’s Rebuttal to China’s Forged Claims. Tokyo: Meisei-sha, Inc, 2000. pp. 63.

167. Cheng Zhaoqi, “Was the Nanking Massacre a Fabrication of the Tokyo Trial?” in The Tokyo Trial: Recollections and Perspectives from China. Cambridge University Press, 2016. pp. 26.

168. Timothy Brook, “The Tokyo Judgment and the Rape of Nanking.” The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 60, no. 3, 2001, pp. 679-80.

169. Zhang Xianwen, et al. A History of the Nanking Massacre. Cengage Learning Asia Pte Ltd, 2019. pp. 443-5.

170. Cheng Zhaoqi, “Was the Nanking Massacre a Fabrication of the Tokyo Trial?” in The Tokyo Trial: Recollections and Perspectives from China. Cambridge University Press, 2016. pp. 11.

171. Cheng Zhaoqi, “Was the Nanking Massacre a Fabrication of the Tokyo Trial?” in The Tokyo Trial: Recollections and Perspectives from China. Cambridge University Press, 2016. pp. 13-5.

172. Neil Boister and Robert Cryer, Documents on the Tokyo International Military Tribunal: Charter, Indictment and Judgments. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. pp. 786-8.

173. Higashinakano Shudo, The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 60.

174. Higashinakano Shudo, The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 59.

175. Fujiwara Akira, “The Nanking Atrocity: An Interpretive Overview” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 41-2.

176. Higashinakano Shudo, The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 60-2.

177. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 147.

178. Higashinakano Shudo, The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 65.

179. Higashinakano Shudo, The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 68-9.

180. Higashinakano Shudo, The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 74.

181. Cheng Zhaoqi, The Nanjing Massacre and Sino-Japanese Relations: Examining the Japanese ‘illusion’ School. Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. pp. 127. “[A]lthough there are a few differences between the expressions of the orders by the 10th Army, the 114th Division and the 128th Brigade, they are totally consistence (sic) with each other in the principle of ‘wiping out enemies’. And ‘at all costs’ mentioned in the division and brigade order is particularly noteworthy.”

182. Higashinakano Shudo, The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 80.

183. Higashinakano Shudo, The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 82.

184. Higashinakano Shudo, The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 77.

185. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 94, 245. For the full entry see Suping Lu, The 1937 - 1938 Nanjing Atrocities. Springer Singapore, 2019. pp. 218.

186. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 93.

187. Suping Lu, The 1937 - 1938 Nanjing Atrocities. Springer Singapore, 2019. pp. 218.

188. Higashinakano Shudo. The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 78-9.

189. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 93, 140.

190. Cheng Zhaoqi, The Nanjing Massacre and Sino-Japanese Relations: Examining the Japanese ‘illusion’ School. Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. pp. 121.

191. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 94.

192. Daqing Yang, “The Nanjing Atrocity: Is Constructive Dialogue Possible?” in Daqing Yang et al. Toward a History Beyond Borders: Contentious Issues in Sino-Japanese Relation, 1st ed., vol. 340, Harvard University Asia Center, Cambridge (Massachusetts); London, 2012, pp. 201.

193. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 102.

194. Higashinakano Shudo. The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 87-8.

195. Higashinakano Shudo. The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 88.

196. Higashinakano Shudo. The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 88.

197. Suping Lu, The 1937 - 1938 Nanjing Atrocities. Springer Singapore, 2019. pp. 213.

198. Higashinakano Shudo. The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 89.

199. Ono Kenji, “Massacre near Mufushan” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 78.

200. Higashinakano Shudo. The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 89.

201. Suping Lu, The 1937 - 1938 Nanjing Atrocities. Springer Singapore, 2019. pp. 214.

202. Higashinakano Shudo. The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 91.

203. Ono Kenji, “Massacre near Mufushan” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 77.

204. Ono Kenji, “Massacre near Mufushan” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 77.

205. Higashinakano Shudo. The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 89.

206. Higashinakano Shudo. The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 89.

207. Higashinakano Shudo. The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 93-4.

208. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 123.

209. Ono Kenji, “Massacre near Mufushan” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 79.

210. Katsuichi Honda, Frank Gibney, and Karen E. Sandness. The Nanjing Massacre: A Japanese Journalist Confronts Japan’s National Shame. Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 1999. pp. 349.

211. Suping Lu, The 1937 - 1938 Nanjing Atrocities. Springer Singapore, 2019. pp. 215.

212. Katsuichi Honda, Frank Gibney, and Karen E. Sandness. The Nanjing Massacre: A Japanese Journalist Confronts Japan’s National Shame. Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 1999. pp. 349.

213. Higashinakano Shudo, The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 127-29, 148.

214. Nanking Jiken Chosa Kenkyukai, Nankin Daigyakusatsu Hiteiron 13 No Uso Tōkyō: Kashiwa Shobō, 2005. pp. 163.

215. Kasahara Tokushi, “Higashinakano Osamichi: The Last Word in Denial” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 324.

216. Kasahara Tokushi, “Higashinakano Osamichi: The Last Word in Denial” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 325.

217. Nanking Jiken Chosa Kenkyukai, Nankin Daigyakusatsu Hiteiron 13 No Uso Tōkyō: Kashiwa Shobō, 2005. pp. 166-7.

218. Imperial veteran recalls Nanjing mass executions | The Japan Times

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220. John Rabe and Erwin Wickert, The Good Man of Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1998. pp. 72.

221. (NMP0158) The Nanking Massacre Archival Project: Documents | Yale University Library

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223. Suping Lu, The 1937 - 1938 Nanjing Atrocities. Springer Singapore, 2019. pp. 345.

224. Suping Lu, The 1937 - 1938 Nanjing Atrocities. Springer Singapore, 2019. pp. 347.

225. Higashinakano Shudo. The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 143.

226. (NMP0146) The Nanking Massacre Archival Project: Documents | Yale University Library

227. Higashinakano Shudo. The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 146.

228. Timothy Brook, Documents on the Rape of Nanking. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 2003. pp. 106.

229. Higashinakano Shudo. The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 215.

230. Suping Lu, The 1937 - 1938 Nanjing Atrocities. Springer Singapore, 2019. pp. 281.

231. Suping Lu, A Dark Page in History: The Nanjing Massacre and Post-Massacre Social Conditions Recorded in British Diplomatic Dispatches, Admiralty Documents, and U.S. Naval Intelligence Reports. Lanham: Hamilton Books, 2018. pp. 10.

232. Timothy Brook, Documents on the Rape of Nanking. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 2003. pp. 106.

233. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 97.

234. Higashinakano Shudo. The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 206-7.

235. (NMP0158) The Nanking Massacre Archival Project: Documents | Yale University Library

236. Nanking Jiken Chosa Kenkyukai, Nankin Daigyakusatsu Hiteiron 13 No Uso Tōkyō: Kashiwa Shobō, 2005. pp. 128.

237. Higashinakano Shudo. The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 207.

238. Nanking Jiken Chosa Kenkyukai, Nankin Daigyakusatsu Hiteiron 13 No Uso Tōkyō: Kashiwa Shobō, 2005. pp. 128.

239. Nanking Jiken Chosa Kenkyukai, Nankin Daigyakusatsu Hiteiron 13 No Uso Tōkyō: Kashiwa Shobō, 2005. pp. 129.

240. Higashinakano Shudo. The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 312.

241. Cheng Zhaoqi, The Nanjing Massacre and Sino-Japanese Relations: Examining the Japanese ‘illusion’ School. Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. pp. 405.

242. Higashinakano Shudo. The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 201.

243. Higashinakano Shudo. The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 203.

244. (NMP0208) The Nanking Massacre Archival Project: Documents | Yale University Library

245. (NMP0225) The Nanking Massacre Archival Project: Documents | Yale University Library

246. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 112.

247. Zhang Xianwen, et al. A History of the Nanking Massacre. Cengage Learning Asia Pte Ltd, 2019. pp. 290-1.

248. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 112.

249. Higashinakano Shudo. The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 206.

250. Suping Lu, The 1937 - 1938 Nanjing Atrocities. Springer Singapore, 2019. pp. 284.

251. Higashinakano Shudo. The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 208.

252. Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi “Leftover Problems” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 379.

253. Higashinakano Shudo. The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 207.

254. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000. pp. 111.

255. Suping Lu, The 1937 - 1938 Nanjing Atrocities. Springer Singapore, 2019. Chapter 11.

256. Suping Lu, The 1937 - 1938 Nanjing Atrocities. Springer Singapore, 2019. pp. 284.

257. Higashinakano Shudo, The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 215-6.

258. Higashinakano Shudo, The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 234.

259. (NMP0100) (NMP0102) The Nanking Massacre Archival Project: Documents | Yale University Library

260. Kasahara Tokushi, “Higashinakano Osamichi: The Last Word in Denial” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 327.

261. Higashinakano Shudo, The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 219.

262. Higashinakano Shudo, The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 219-20.

263. Kasahara Tokushi, “Higashinakano Osamichi: The Last Word in Denial” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 325.

264. Higashinakano Shudo. The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 240.

265. Sergey Romanov, Holocaust Controversies: Rebutting the "Twitter denial": the most popular Holocaust denial memes debunked

266. Zhang Xianwen, et al. A History of the Nanking Massacre. Cengage Learning Asia Pte Ltd, 2019. pp. 321.

267. Nanking Jiken Chosa Kenkyukai, Nankin Daigyakusatsu Hiteiron 13 No Uso Tōkyō: Kashiwa Shobō, 2005. pp. 65.

268. Takashi Yoshida, “Wartime Accounts of the Nanking Atrocity” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 250.

269. Higashinakano Shudo, The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 225-6.

270. Nanking Jiken Chosa Kenkyukai, Nankin Daigyakusatsu Hiteiron 13 No Uso Tōkyō: Kashiwa Shobō, 2005. pp. 63-4. Higashinakano Shudo, The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 225-6.

271. Takashi Yoshida, “Wartime Accounts of the Nanking Atrocity” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 248.

272. Nanking Jiken Chosa Kenkyukai, Nankin Daigyakusatsu Hiteiron 13 No Uso Tōkyō: Kashiwa Shobō, 2005. pp. 64.

273. Higashinakano Shudo, The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 222.

274. Nanking Jiken Chosa Kenkyukai, Nankin Daigyakusatsu Hiteiron 13 No Uso Tōkyō: Kashiwa Shobō, 2005. pp. 68. Higashinakano elsewhere states “Mao Zedong did not believe that there had been a massacre in Nanking.”

275. Zhang Xianwen, et al. A History of the Nanking Massacre. Cengage Learning Asia Pte Ltd, 2019. pp. 324.

276. Nanking Jiken Chosa Kenkyukai, Nankin Daigyakusatsu Hiteiron 13 No Uso Tōkyō: Kashiwa Shobō, 2005. pp. 68-9.

277. Takashi Yoshida, “Wartime Accounts of the Nanking Atrocity” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 249-54. Nanking Jiken Chosa Kenkyukai, Nankin Daigyakusatsu Hiteiron 13 No Uso Tōkyō: Kashiwa Shobō, 2005. pp. 60-71.

278. Higashinakano Shudo, The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: a Historian’s Quest for the Truth. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2006. pp. 222-3.

279. Takashi Yoshida, “Wartime Accounts of the Nanking Atrocity” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity, 1937-1938. Complicating the Picture. Oxford: Berghahn Books Ltd, 2017. pp. 251-2.

280. Takashi Yoshida, The Making of the "Rape of Nanking": History and Memory in Japan, China, and the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. pp. 28-31.