Tripping over Dadrian's Tombstone
Review of Benny Morris and Dror Ze'evi's The Thirty-Year Genocide: Turkey's Destruction of Its Christian Minorities, 1894-1924. Harvard University Press, 2021.
Benny Morris and Dror Ze’evi have contributed a 656-page book to Ottoman and Genocide studies. Contrary to most scholarship, Morris and Ze’evi present a genocidal continuum from 1894 to 1924 that encompasses the Hamidian massacres under Sultan Abdülhamid II, (pp. 44 134) the 1909 anti-Armenian pogroms in Adana, (pp. 144) 1913-1914 expulsion of Greeks from Eastern Thrace and Aegean coast, (pp. 148-55) 1915-1916 extermination of Armenians and Assyrians, (pp. 155-262, 373-379) and the atrocities by the Turkish Nationalists (Kemalist) against the remaining Christian populations of the empire. (pp. 293 484) This is despite the fact they acknowledge Historians “arguably have good reasons” for not doing the same. (pp. 4) I agree with Morris and Ze’evi that none of these events can be viewed in a vacuum - to steal the vocabulary of António Guterres.1 But, I’m not sure “it is clear that treating the three periods separately obfuscates the reality of what the Turks intended and what transpired.” (Ibid. - Emphasis added) For example, nothing was lost in Ronald Grigory Suny’s book They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else, where he chose to emphasize the contrasts between these different episodes of violence. While we lack an all-inclusive account, Morris and Ze’evi do not provide us with such as their work is heavily focused on the experience of Armenians. We only briefly hear about the experience of Greeks in 1914 with a detailed chapter dedicated to the Kemalist years. The experience of Assyrians during the 30-year period is only dedicated 6 pages, most of which are focused on 1915-16.2 This is despite the significance ascribed to their slaughter by the authors. (pp. 496)
The book has merit in how it impressively draws upon part of the existing secondary literature and primary sources from various archives and synthesizes this information into well-written chunks detailing the violence against these once-prominent communities. Of particular interest is “Part Two: The Young Turks,” which divides the empire along poorly defined boundaries and contains multiple regional studies with a wealth of evidence. Unfortunately, this information is sandwiched between Morris and Ze’evi’s outmoded analysis of Ottoman decision-making and an overemphasis on ‘Islamic ideology’. Vahakn N. Dadrian’s fingerprint seems to be found throughout the book.
Archival Bias
In 2019, the Journal of Genocide Research hosted a book forum for Morris and Ze’evi’s book. One contributor, Laura Robson, asked a poignant question: “Without a framework of contemporary secondary literature, then, where are Morris and Ze’evi getting their ideas?”3 Since 1990, the Prime Ministerial Ottoman archive in Istanbul (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri) has largely4 remained open to researchers. It has been the backbone for many seminal studies on the Ottoman Empire’s treatment of its Christian populations. Morris and Ze’evi, however, primarily draw on “the correspondence of foreign diplomats and testimonies of missionaries, which is a corpus of material that many scholars have previously culled”.5 The importance of such materials cannot be understated as they’re largely complementary with the documents drawn upon by historians working in the BOA.6
This choice leads to awkward decisions in the authors’ adjudication of sources. Many of the cited accounts are not from those who directly witnessed violence. In one instance, they cite British consul Hammond Shipley, who reported that “Armenian witnesses testified that the Kurds were “saying among themselves” that they had received orders from the Ottoman authorities “to exterminate the Armenians.” (pp. 47) They, however, buried Shipley’s uncertainty as to the reliability of this information in a footnote. (pp. 517 fn. 47) In another instance, Morris and Ze’evi cite a British diplomatic report that Turkish Muslims were “animated with the old spirit of meting out Islam on the sword to their Christian subjects.” This was to serve as evidence of “strident religiosity” and “visceral hatred of Christians” motivating perpetrators in “Asia Minor”. (pp. 116) On other occasions, Morris and Ze’evi cite third to fourth-hand testimony without informing the reader, like their citation of hearsay from the Russian consul-general recorded by a Danish source. (pp. 151)
To repeat, the use of foreign archives is almost essential for studying not only the Armenian & Assyrian genocides of 1915-16 but also the other events discussed in Morris and Ze’evi’s account. But there is almost an over-reliance on British and American materials. Over 85 percent of citations in their chapter on the Hamidian massacres consist of British or American primary sources.7 This imbalance is not necessarily problematic, but the fact that materials are not presented with adequate context is.
Despite heavily drawing upon American archival materials they don’t seem to have thoroughly exploited those of Henry Morgenthau Sr. This is interesting, as Morgenthau had privileged access to Talât and Enver Paşa.8 The records and memoirs Morgenthau left behind are important for understanding the mentality of the perpetrators and, in part, the decision-making over time of the Young Turks.
German and Austro-Hungarian Archives
Morris and Ze’evi incorporate more German materials, provided by Wolfgang Gust (pp.11) in chapters 4 and 5, but not comprehensively. (It’s also worth mentioning that Gust’s work has limitations.9) The authors, at least once, mislead their readers by attributing the words of Stefan Ihrig to German Ambassador Wangenheim.10 (pp. 146) They also claim to utilize Artem Ohandjanian’s “volume of Austro-Hungarian diplomatic reports”. (ibid.) However, one finds only three references to Austro-Hungarian officials. (pp. 183, 216, 388) This obviously undermines their assertion of having extensively used “German and Austrian diplomats, residents, and travelers” in some chapters. (pp. 10)
They do quote some of the admissions made to German officials. (pp. 180, 190.) Other declarations are inexplicably ignored. For example, Morris and Ze’evi make multiple references to the reports of the German consul in Aleppo, Walter Rößler, (pp. 166-8, 232, 234, 239) but do not quote his recollection that “the Commissioner of Deportation” had told him “We want an Armenia without Armenians.” (“Vous ne comprenez pas ce que nous voulons, nous voulons une Arménie sans Arméniens.”)11 This appears to have been mantra as Rößler quoted Eyub Bey stating “we want to obliterate the Armenian name once and for all.”12
Two-track communications?
On pages 173 and 174 Morris and Ze’evi cite the testimony of Ahmed Moukhtar Bay13 and Reşid Akif Paşa. These testimonies have been used for decades to promote the idea that the Ottoman state established a system of “duel-track” governance.14 According to Akçam “The dual-track mechanism appears to have functioned more or less as follows: deportation orders were conveyed via official channels from the Interior Ministry to the provincial governors, who then circulated them to the security service units in the region; namely, the security organization connected to the Interior Ministry and the gendarmerie. As for the massacre of the deportee convoys, an operation overseen by Bahaeddin Şakir of the CUP Central Committee, coded killing orders were conveyed to the provinces primarily by the party’s responsible secretaries.”15 While Morris and Ze’evi do not explicitly describe the dual-track mechanism in their book, they do cite a number of statements as credible evidence of “direct orders” to kill. They state that Ahmed Moukhtar Bay testified to having received “two orders” and, in describing Reşid Akif Paşa’s speech, they write, “[a]fter the initial order of deportation was sent to the provinces,” an “inauspicious order was circulated by the Central Committee” to çete gangs to murder convoys.
They also cite Eugen Büge’s belief that the order to spare Catholics and Protestants from deportation was a deliberate ruse, with clandestine instructions to act contrary to the order being conveyed to the vali by a confidential messenger. (pp. 228) Morris and Ze’evi do not clarify that the German embassy “did not share Büge’s assessment.”16
The evidence for such a system of governance remains circumstantial, relying largely on interpretative readings of statements from Ottoman officials and foreign diplomats. As Hilmar Kaiser notes no “direct evidence like original counter orders has been presented”.17 The concept of a “two-track system of communication”18 was developed by Vahakn Dadrian to explain allegedly “benign sounding” communications from the central authorities - such as orders to “protect the convoys” or to “punish the transgressors”.19 Such orders, however, are not in contradiction with the central authorities’ policy of annihilation.20 While the “dual-track mechanism” has gained popularity among specialists, they still haven’t provided a satisfactory explanation for “compromising proposals” like Talât Paşa’s approval for Mehmed Reşid Paşa’s militia going through official channels.21
Handling of Ottoman archives.
Because of the issues discussed above, Hilmar Kaiser suggested, “it might be more productive to try and understand the extermination of Ottoman Armenians through the documented policies of the Ottoman government and especially of the Ministry of Interior and its branches.” Morris and Ze’evi, contrary to this advice, decided to add Ottoman documents fragmentarily throughout their study. It leads to inaccurate claims that “the only such accessible Turkish document openly admitting a massacre” is Talât Paşa’s censuring of Mehmed Reşid Paşa for “murdering non-Armenians, in contravention of his orders.” (pp. 7) An inexplicable mistake, given the subsequent correspondence between Talât and Reşid disproves this assertion. It’s also unclear if Morris and Ze’evi also have seen the relevant document. Their footnote makes it appear that they lifted the citation from the research of Uğur Ümit Üngör.22 (pp. 172, 542 fn. 3)
Morris and Ze’evi also give limited emphasis to some of the most important Ottoman materials. (pp. 172-3) Apparently, Ottoman materials detailing regulations on the concentration of Armenians by province,23 seizure and transfer of Armenian property,24 and knowledge that the “resettlement” zone was inhospitable25 are not worthy of detailed discussion.
They call into question the reliability of Turkish archives. Their assertion mimics Dadrian’s claim that “a closer scrutiny of the facts suggests (...) that the [Ottoman archival] material thus made available [in the Prime Minister’s Archive] is not only suspect but unreliable.”26 Morris and Ze’evi, correctly, note the BOA archive appears to have “undergone several bouts of purging” and “Turkish officials have further sanitized the archives” by withholding compromising materials. This leads them to conclude, echoing Dadrian, “the main reason not to trust the Turkish archives is that reliable sources contradict them.” (pp. 8 - Emphasis added) Taner Akçam notes that this position is obviously “wrongheaded,” as 1) not all incriminatory materials could be purged given the extent of the Ottoman apparatus, and 2) the remaining materials do not substantiate the Turkish nationalist thesis.27 More compromising materials exist in the BOA than Morris and Ze’evi lead on.28
Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa - The nightmare of the field?
A “shadowy construct” appears throughout the Young Turks section of Morris and Ze’evi’s book. The Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa was originally used for clandestine operations against foreign countries. This included - at different points in time - intelligence gathering, guerrilla warfare, and encouraging revolts among Turkish and Muslim populations of enemy countries. Morris and Ze’evi claim that “after May 1915, the Special Organization’s focus changed” and they would organize the extermination of Armenians. (pp. 139) Their analysis of the organization largely mimics that of Dadrian’s29 and does not account for modern research on the organization.30 Morris and Ze’evi seem, in part, to acknowledge this when they state some scholars argue the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa “as a body” may not have been “part of the extermination process”. (pp. 7)
They repeat the unsubstantiated claim that about 10,000 prisoners were released to “reinforce” the special organization. (pp. 139) This would’ve amounted to nearly one-third of the Ottoman prison system.31 We’ve been able to document targeted releases for the creation of Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa çetes32, but they obviously do not substantiate claims of a mass release. The issue is definitely a worthwhile inquiry for future research.33
At a Hrant Dink Foundation conference, November 20-21, 2015, Hilmar Kaiser noted during the Q&A: “Basically, the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa is the nightmare of our field. Because everything is Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa the moment a çetes turns up. (…) This is a gift from Vahakn Dadrian to us. (…)”34 This conflation has been promoted in works seeking to combat denial.35 As mentioned, Morris and Ze’evi present the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa as an administrative body that handled the logistics of the extermination of the Ottoman Armenians in the Eastern provinces. (pp. 139, 171) This presentation is at odds with the fact that the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa was answerable to the Ottoman military,36 not the Ministry of Interior, and largely only carried out massacres near the front lines. The Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa played an organizing role at massacre sites like Kemah37, but, generally, massacres were carried out by “local militiamen, gendarmes, Kurdish tribal groups, or cut-throats hired from the local population” organized by trusted administrators and officers.38
Jihad
Vahakn Dadrian argued that Islam, rather than simply playing a discursive divide between Muslims and Christians, was the guiding dogma of Turkish massacres from Sultan Abdülhamid II to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.39 He also detailed perceived continuity between the 1894-6 “rehearsal for the subsequent 1915–18 cataclysm” and the 1920-23 ‘targeting of survivors’ by the Nationalists.40 Morris and Ze’evi, as mentioned in the introduction, argue along similar lines, saying to disaggregate these episodes would be to “obfuscate” (pp. 4) them, and that despite operating under three separate regimes with “different ideological umbrellas,” (pp. 505) there was a “nexus between Islam and massacre”. (pp. 117) Points that critical reviewers have disputed.41
Hans-Lukas Kieser defends Morris and Ze’evi, stating many critics adopt an “unfair” and “superficial reading” of their handling of Islam as being “essentialist”. Kieser notes that religion went beyond an “ethnic marker” and that many perpetrators made allusions to “Islam to justify what they did.”42 Kieser, however, is being deceptive, as Morris and Ze’evi go beyond such analysis. Morris and Ze’evi argued that “the nationalism that drove the murderous campaigns of 1909 and 1914–1923 also had a religious undertone – as nationalism in most Muslim Middle Eastern countries in the Twentieth Century has always had. To put it another way, given the non-separation of church and state in the Muslim Middle East, the nationalist politics of the region have often been underwritten by an Islamic mindset and beliefs.” (pp. 472) This is a recurring theme/problem throughout the book. (pp. 5, 115-21, 147-8, 491-6, 505-6.)
Morris and Ze’evi seem to have recognized this and attempted to argue that “we made clear in our book [that] Islam per se is not the culprit.”43 While they do write that “‘Islam’ in itself is not a sufficient explanation” for the killings, they only offer a listing of reductive or opaque motives without exploring the “specific convergences” of these motives. (pp. 5-6, 505-6) Such disclaimers, for example, do not prevent the authors from ascribing the burning of Smyrna to a Koranic dictate without further evidence. (pp. 429) The evidence cited by Morris and Ze’evi does not support their assertion that “Ottoman authorities invoked jihad to mobilize the Muslim masses to massacre and plunder”. (pp. 5, 147-8.) Their framing of the Ottoman proclamation of jihad (the holy war) of November 11, 1914, mirrors contemporary propaganda44 and has no basis.45
Benny Morris, in the past, has emphasized religion’s role in other events he’s written about. Specifically, see his book 1948: A History of the First Arab–Israeli War.46 In 1948, Morris drew upon an insufficient source basis to argue the Arab states viewed the First Arab-Israeli War as a Jihad against Israel and that their goal “at [a] minimum” was to destroy Israel “at inception”. Such an objective for the Arab expeditionary forces, however, was impractical and is not reflected in their military operations.47 The Jihadi character of the war is developed for 3 pages and is little more than stringing together a collection of quotes of varying significance. A full paragraph, for example, is dedicated to statements made by the King of Saudi Arabia, Ibn Saud, between 1943 and 1948 despite the fact Saudi Arabia did not take part in the war.48 Similarly, in The Thirty-Year Genocide, Morris and Ze’evi cite a string of statements made by Bahaettin Şakır prior to 1910 as evidence that the C.U.P. “were Islamists like Abdülhamid, not the secularists assumed in conventional history.” (pp.147) The cited quotes do not substantiate their assertion.
Errors and Misadventures
Of course, lengthy and complex studies on ‘contentious’ subjects by newcomers are prone to errors, but Morris and Ze’evi’s work contains numerous mistakes. It is puzzling that the authors have concluded that Turkey has “always barred” scholars from conducting research at the Ankara Military Archives (ATASE). (pp. 8) While true a decade ago, research in the ATASE has been conducted by many notable scholars. (Some examples would be Michael Reynolds, Taner Akçam, Hans-Lukas Kieser, Hilmar Kaiser, and Benjamin Fortna.) Talât Paşa was not “a scion of a Bulgarian Muslim family”, (pp. 147) but was in fact middle-class with mixed Turkish origins.49 Reşid Paşa did not receive “military training”, (pp. 199) although he served briefly in the military, but medical training at the Military School of Medicine.50 They assert that in 1909 “there were more than 200,000 Armenians in the [Adana] vilayet,” (pp. 277) which is unsupported by all available census records.51 Nor did “the wartime CUP and Special Organization leaders” flee on “October 14th.” (pp. 265) The CUP leadership escaped on a German torpedo boat on November 1, 1918. Such errors raise questions as to the care taken in assembling the book.
Morris and Ze’evi have drawn several hasty conclusions in their book, as previously detailed. Lacking “hard evidence” of a genocidal plan, Morris and Ze’evi rely on inference and speculation to support their argument that the CUP’s planning began as early as September 1914 (pp. 239, 249-52) Morris and Ze’evi believe they’ve shown “strong indications” of “a concrete plan” for genocide; however, contemporary research has convincingly demonstrated that decision-making was more of an evolving process.52
In their conclusion, Morris and Ze’evi offer a concise comparison between the “Thirty-Year Genocide” and the Jewish Shoah. (pp. 500–5) Contrary to other authors, they do not equate the two but rather highlight their differences. Armenians, unlike Jews, had limited capacity to assimilate or remained unmolested within designated areas.53 The Committee of Union and Progress was not a monolithic party as many Ottoman officials, including Djemal Paşa, resisted the exterminatory policy.54 While they recognize that Djemal “aided the refugees created by the deportation process” and his actions “saved quite a few,” they fail to analyze the circumstances in depth, simply reiterating the statements of a British informant. (pp. 229-30, 500)
Other observations, however, suggest that polemics have seeped into the authors' work, raising further questions to their objectivity. Often, their contrasts serve to whitewash the actions of Nazi perpetrators. For instance, it is claimed that the massacre of Christians in Turkey was “far more sadistic” than the Nazi genocide of the Jews, which was described as much more “impersonal” for the perpetrators. (p. 501) Anyone knowledgeable about the history of the Holocaust would likely argue that such an examination does not accurately reflect reality. No act committed by “the Turk” would be unimaginable to their Nazi counterpart. According to Morris and Ze’evi, the Nazis merely “burned corpses,” whereas “the Turks” burned “thousands” alive. The Nazis did burn infants alive during the Hungarian operation at Auschwitz, reported back to Berlin on the thousands of Jews they had killed, and committed acts such as disembowelment, mutilation of women, and setting animals on Jews.
Rusbridger, Alan. “The Horrors of 7 October Did Not Happen in a Vacuum – so Why Has It Become Unsayable?” Independent, 16 Feb. 2024.
This decision is strange as there is a fair amount of literature on the Sayfo. Courtois, Sébastien. Forgotten Genocide: The Eastern Christians, The Last Arameans. Gorgias Press, 2004. Gaunt, David. Massacres, Resistance, Protectors: Muslim-Christian Relations in Eastern Anatolia during World War I. Gorgias Press, 2006. Donef, Racho. Assyrians Post-Nineveh: Identity, Fragmentation, Conflict and Survival (672 BC-1920): A Study of Assyrogenous Communities. Tatavla Publishing, 2012. Donef, Racho. The Hakkâri Massacres: An Anthology of Documents Related to Massacres and Deportation of Assyrians in Northern Mesopotamia: Ethnic Cleansing by Turkey, 1924-25. Tatavla Publishing, 2014. Gaunt, David, et al., editors. Let Them Not Return: Sayfo: The Genocide against the Assyrian, Syriac and Chaldean Christians in the Ottoman Empire. Berghahn, 2019.
The Zoryan Institute published Collective and State Violence in Turkey: The Construction of a National Identity from Empire to Nation-State via Berghahn Books, which contains a great article by David Gaunt on the “Long Assyrian Genocide.” The book, however, was published after Morris and Ze’evi’s Thirty-Year Genocide, so I’ve decided not to include this work in the above list. A noteworthy criticism of Morris and Ze’evi in Gaunt’s article is “Historians date modern mass violence against Assyrians to the 1830s, and some would push this date even earlier. Thus, it is much longer than the ‘Thirty-Year Genocide’ described by Morris and Ze’evi.” (pp. 57)
Robson, Laura. “Minorities, Islam, genocide?” Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 22, no. 4, 12 Mar. 2020, pp. 545.
Sarafian, Ara. “The Ottoman Archives Debate and the Armenian Genocide.” Armenian Forum, vol. 2, no. 1, 1999, pp. 35–44.
Gaunt, David. “When Perpetual Persecution Becomes Ottoman Genocide.” Bustan: The Middle East Book Review, vol. 11, no. 1, 2020, pp. 4.
Some examples of works drawing heavily from the BOA see Kaiser, Hilmar, et al. At the Crossroads of Der Zor: Death, Survival, and Humanitarian Resistance in Aleppo, 1915-1917. Gomidas Institute, 2001. Akçam, Taner. A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility. Picador, 2007. Dündar, Fuat. Crime of Numbers: The Role of Statistics in the Armenian Question (1878-1918). Transactions Publishers, 2010. Üngör, Uğur Ümit, and Mehmet Polatel. Confiscation and Destruction: The Young Turk Seizure of Armenian Property. Continuum, 2011. Akçam, Taner. The Young Turks’ Crime against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire. Princeton University Press, 2013. Kaiser, Hilmar. The Extermination of Armenians in the Diarbekir Region. İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2014. Akçam, Taner, and Umit Kurt. The Spirit of the Laws: The Plunder of Wealth in the Armenian Genocide. Berghahn Books, 2015. Kieser, Hans-Lukas, et al., editors. The End of the Ottomans: The Genocide of 1915 and the Politics of Turkish Nationalism. I.B. Tauris, 2019.
Robson, Laura. “Minorities, Islam, genocide?” Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 22, no. 4, 12 Mar. 2020, pp. 545.
Sarafian, Ara. United States Official Records on the Armenian Genocide 1915-1917. Gomidas Institute, 2004. Morgenthau, Henry. United States Diplomacy on the Bosphorus: The Diaries of Ambassador Morgenthau, 1913-1916. Gomidas Institute, 2004. Morgenthau, Henry. Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story. Gomidas Institute, 2016.
Kaiser, Hilmar. Book Reviews, Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 8, no. 3, Sept. 2006, pp. 355–359.
Stefan Ihrig’s summary of Ambassador Wangenheim’s report is quoted as if directly from his letter.
Gust, Wolfgang. The Armenian Genocide: Evidence from the German Foreign Office Archives, 1915-1916. Berghahn Books, 2014. pp. 776.
Gust, Wolfgang. The Armenian Genocide: Evidence from the German Foreign Office Archives, 1915-1916. Berghahn Books, 2014. pp. 510.
Morris and Ze’evi appear to incorrectly state Ahmed Moukhtar Baas was interrogated “[a]fter the war”. The document is dated December 26, 1916.
Dadrian, Vahakn N. “The Naim-Andonian Documents on the World War I Destruction of Ottoman Armenians: The Anatomy of a Genocide.” International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 18, no. 3, 1986, pp. 339.
Akçam, Taner. The Young Turks’ Crime against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire. Princeton University Press, 2013. pp. 194.
Kaiser, Hilmar. “Shukru Bey and the Armenian Deportations in the Fall of 1915.” Syria in World War I: Politics, Economy and Society, Routledge, London, 2015. pp. 176. For the relevant documents see Gust, Wolfgang. The Armenian Genocide: Evidence from the German Foreign Office Archives, 1915-1916. Berghahn Books, 2014. pp. 376-8.
Kaiser, Hilmar. The Extermination of Armenians in the Diarbekir Region. İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2014. pp. 170.
Dadrian, Vahakn N. The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus. Berghahn Books, 2008. pp. 384.
Dadrian, Vahakn N. The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus. Berghahn Books, 2008. pp. 384. Akçam, Taner. The Young Turks’ Crime against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire. Princeton University Press, 2013. pp. 193-8.
As Khatchig Mouradian notes, “Denialist historians have produced several documents from the Ottoman archives concerning measures taken by Talaat and other CUP leaders to curb, and in certain cases even punish, attacks by irregulars and bandits (…) This policy is not inconsistent with the state’s policy of destruction—in fact it is very much consistent with it: the state strove for as much control over violence as possible.” Mouradian, Khatchig. The Resistance Network: The Armenian Genocide and Humanitarianism in Ottoman Syria, 1915–1918. Michigan State University Press, 2021. pp. 196-7. fn. 93. For a detailed case study see Kaiser, Hilmar. “Financing the Ruling Party and Its Militants in Wartime: The Armenian Genocide and the Kemah Massacres of 1915.” Études Arméniennes Contemporaines, no. 12, 28 Feb. 2019, pp. 7–31.
Kaiser, Hilmar. The Extermination of Armenians in the Diarbekir Region. İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2014. pp. 166-7, 170-1. For more information I’d highly recommend reading Hilmar Kaiser’s book. Diarbekir has also been covered by David Gaunt, Hans-Lukas Kieser, Ugur Ümit Üngör and Mehmet Polatel. The mistakes in their work are corrected in Kaiser’s case study. For those interested in further reading, though, see Gaunt, David. Massacres, Resistance, Protectors: Muslim-Christian Relations in Eastern Anatolia during World War I. Gorgias Press, 2006. Kieser, Hans-Lukas. “Dr. Mehmed Reshid (1873–1919): A Political Doctor.” Der Völkermord an Den Armeniern Und Die Shoah: The Armenian Genocide and the Shoah, Chronos, Zürich, 2002, pp. 245–280. Üngör, Uğur Ümit, and Mehmet Polatel. Confiscation and Destruction: The Young Turk Seizure of Armenian Property. Bloomsbury Academic, 2011. Üngör, Uğur Ümit. The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1913-1950. Oxford University Press, 2012.
This citation practice is reminiscent of Anne Applebaum’s Red Famine: Stalin's War on Ukraine. “The book has one odd quirk, namely its citation practice. (…) Her footnotes are bulging with archival citations, however, because every time she quotes something from a secondary source that has an archival reference, she gives that as well – and then lists all these archives among the primary sources in her bibliography. This is not normal scholarly practice, though graduate students sometimes do it for effect before they learn better.” Fitzpatrick, Sheila. “Red Famine by Anne Applebaum Review – Did Stalin Deliberately Let Ukraine Starve? .” The Guardian, 25 Aug. 2017.
Dündar, Fuat. Crime of Numbers: The Role of Statistics in the Armenian Question (1878-1918). Routledge, 2010. pp. 103-7, 113-19. Also worth reading: Dündar, Fuat. “Taner Akçam’ın Son Kitabı Vesilesiyle %10 Katliam Sorunu: Ermeni Meselesi Hallolunmuş mudur?” Toplumsal Tarih, vol. 174, June 2008, pp. 79–83.
Baghdjian, Kévork K. La Confiscation Par Le Gouvernement Turc, Des Biens Arméniens Dits “Abandonnés” [The Confiscation of Armenian Properties by the Turkish Government Said to Be Abandoned]. Toriguian, Shavarsh. The Armenian Question and International Law. ULV Press, 1988. Payette et Simms, 1987. Kaiser, Hilmar. “Armenian Property, Ottoman Law and Nationality Policies during the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1916.” The First World War as Remembered in the Countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2006, pp. 49–71. Dündar, Fuat. Crime of Numbers: The Role of Statistics in the Armenian Question (1878-1918). Routledge, 2010. pp. 89-90, 120-1. Üngör, Uğur Ümit, and Mehmet Polatel. Confiscation and Destruction: The Young Turk Seizure of Armenian Property. Bloomsbury Academic, 2011. Akçam, Taner, and Umit Kurt. The Spirit of the Laws: The Plunder of Wealth in the Armenian Genocide. Berghahn Books, 2015. Morack, Ellinor. The Dowry of the State? The Politics of Abandoned Property and the Population Exchange in Turkey, 1921-1945. University of Bamberg Press, 2017. Kurt, Ümit. The Armenians of Aintab: The Economics of Genocide in an Ottoman Province. Harvard University Press, 2021.
Dündar, Fuat. Crime of Numbers: The Role of Statistics in the Armenian Question (1878-1918). Routledge, 2010. pp. 77-9, 131 fn. 55. Dolbee, Samuel. “The Desert at the End of Empire: An Environmental History of the Armenian Genocide.” Past & Present, vol. 247, no. 1, 4 Mar. 2020, pp. 197–233.
Dadrian, Vahakn N. “Ottoman Archives & Denial of the Armenian Genocide.” in Hovannisian, Richard G. The Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, Ethics. Palgrave, 2000. pp. 280-310.
Akçam, Taner. The Young Turks’ Crime against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire. Princeton University Press, 2013. pp. 25-7.
Akçam, Taner. The Young Turks’ Crime against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire. Princeton University Press, 2013. pp. 203-26. Kaiser, Hilmar. The Extermination of Armenians in the Diarbekir Region. İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2014. pp. 166-7 & 252-7.
Dadrian, Vahakn. “The Role of the Special Organisation in the Armenian Genocide during the First World War.” Minorities in Wartime: National and Racial Groupings in Europe, North America and Australia During the Two World Wars, Bloomsbury Academic, London, 2016, pp. 50–82. For a critique of Dadrian’s assertion of two Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa see Safi, Polat. “The Ottoman Special Organization– Teşkilat–ı Mahsusa: An Inquiry into Its Operational and Administrative Characteristics.” Bilkent University, 2012.
Safi, Polat. “The Ottoman Special Organization-Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa: A Historical Assessment with Particular Reference to Its Operations Against British Occupied Egypt (1914-1916).” Bilkent University, 2006. Safi, Polat. “The Ottoman Special Organization– Teşkilat–ı Mahsusa: An Inquiry into Its Operational and Administrative Characteristics.” Bilkent University, 2012. Ahmet, Tetik. Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa (Umur-ı Şarkıyye Dairesi) Tarihi Cilt 1:1914-1916. Türkiye İş Bankası, 2014. Kaiser, Hilmar. The Extermination of Armenians in the Diarbekir Region. İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2014. Özel, Oktay. “Tehcir ve Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa.” 1915. Siyaset, Tehcir, Soykırım, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul, 2015, pp. 377–407. Fortna, Benjamin C. The Circassian: A Life of Esref Bey, Late Ottoman Insurgent and Special Agent. Oxford University Press, 2016.
For the best research on the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa see the entries by Candan Badem and Hilmar Kaiser in Kieser, Hans-Lukas, et al. The End of the Ottomans: The Genocide of 1915 and the Politics of Turkish Nationalism. I.B. Tauris, 2021. Kaiser, Hilmar. “Financing the Ruling Party and Its Militants in Wartime: The Armenian Genocide and the Kemah Massacres of 1915.” Études Arméniennes Contemporaines, no. 12, 28 Feb. 2019, pp. 7–31.
Schull, Kent. Prisons in the Late Ottoman Empire Microcosms of Modernity. Edinburgh University Press, 2014.
Kaiser, Hilmar. The Extermination of Armenians in the Diarbekir Region. İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2014. pp. 127-8, 132-4. Badem, Candan. “The War before War at the Caucasus Front: A Matrix for Genocide.” The End of the Ottomans: The Genocide of 1915 and the Politics of Turkish Nationalism, I.B. Tauris, 2019, pp. 50–51. The police director of Harput, Mehmed Namik Bey, provided a statement to the British post-war that detailed the use of targeted prisoner releases to kill Armenians. Yeghiayan, Vartkes. British Foreign Office Dossiers on Turkish War Criminals. American Armenian International College, 1991. pp. 27.
The source for 10,000 released prisoners appears to be Krikor Guerguerian. (Krieger is Guerguerian’s Pen-Name.) Kévorkian, Raymond. The Armenian Genocide: A Complete History. I.B. Tauris, 2011, pp. 184.
https://hrantdink.org/tr/?Detail=1274&Lang=en Kaiser, Hilmar. “Genocide at the Twilight of the Ottoman Empire.” The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 366. Kaiser, Hilmar. The Extermination of Armenians in the Diarbekir Region. İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2014, pp. 8-10, 361-3.
Akçam, Taner. The Young Turks’ Crime against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire. Princeton University Press, 2013, pp. 417.
Kaiser, Hilmar. “Genocide at the Twilight of the Ottoman Empire.” The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 377.
Kaiser, Hilmar. “Financing the Ruling Party and Its Militants in Wartime: The Armenian Genocide and the Kemah Massacres of 1915.” Études Arméniennes Contemporaines, no. 12, 28 Feb. 2019, pp. 7–31.
Kaiser, Hilmar. “Genocide at the Twilight of the Ottoman Empire.” The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 377.
Dadrian, Vahakn N. The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus. Berghahn Books, 2008. pp. 3-6, 22-3, 113-76, 377-79.
Dadrian, Vahakn N. Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of Turko-Armenian Conflict. Transaction Publishers, 1999, pp. 85. Dadrian, Vahakn N. The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus. Berghahn Books, 2008.
Robson, Laura. “Minorities, Islam, genocide?” Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 22, no. 4, 12 Mar. 2020, pp. 541–547. Usitalo, Steven A. “Book review: The Thirty-Year Genocide: Turkey’s Destruction of Its Christian Minorities, 1894–1924.” Genocide Studies and Prevention, vol. 14, no. 2, Sept. 2020, pp. 176–178. Gutman, David. “The Thirty-Year Genocide: Turkey’s Destruction of Its Christian Minorities, 1894–1924.” Turkish Studies, vol. 21, no. 1, July 2019, pp. 163–165.
“Kieser on Morris and Zeʼevi, ‘the Thirty-Year Genocide: Turkey’s Destruction of Its Christian Minorities, 1894-1924.’” H-Net, Dec. 2019, networks.h-net.org/node/28443/reviews/5479719/kieser-morris-and-ze%CA%BCevi-thirty-year-genocide-turkeys-destruction-its.
Ze’evi, Dror, and Benny Morris. “Response to critique.” Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 22, no. 4, 12 Mar. 2020, pp. 563.
Morgenthau, Henry. Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story. Gomidas Institute, 2016, pp. 161-2.
Suny, Ronald Grigor. “They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else”: A History of the Armenian Genocide. Princeton University Press, 2015, pp. 238-9. Zürcher, Erik Jan. Jihad and Islam in World War I Studies on the Ottoman Jihad on the Centenary of Snouck Hurgronje’s “Holy War Made in Germany.” Leiden University Press, 2016.
Morris, Benny. 1948: A History of the First Arab–Israeli War. Yale University Press, 2008.
Shlaim, Avi. Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine. Columbia University Press, 1988. Shlaim, Avi. “The Debate about 1948.” International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 27, no. 3, 1995, pp. 295.
Morris, Benny. 1948: A History of the First Arab–Israeli War. Yale University Press, 2008, pp. 393-4.
Dündar, Fuat. Crime of Numbers: The Role of Statistics in the Armenian Question (1878-1918). Transactions Publishers, 2010. pp. 182-7.
Kieser, Hans-Lukas. Talaat Pasha: Father of Modern Turkey, Architect of Genocide. Princeton University Press, 2018. pp. 41.
Kieser, Hans-Lukas. “Dr. Mehmed Reshid (1873–1919): A Political Doctor.” Der Völkermord an Den Armeniern Und Die Shoah: The Armenian Genocide and the Shoah, Chronos, Zürich, 2002, pp. 246-7.
Bloxham, Donald. The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians. Oxford University Press, 2005. Gaunt, David. Massacres, Resistance, Protectors: Muslim-Christian Relations in Eastern Anatolia during World War I. Gorgias Press, 2006. Kaiser, Hilmar. “Genocide at the Twilight of the Ottoman Empire.” The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 365–85. Kaiser, Hilmar. “Regional resistance to central government policies: Ahmed Djemal Pasha, the governors of Aleppo, and Armenian deportees in the spring and summer of 1915.” Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 12, no. 3–4, Dec. 2010, pp. 173–218. Gerlach, Christian. Extremely Violent Societies: Mass Violence in the Twentieth-Century World. Cambridge University Press, 2010. Dündar, Fuat. Crime of Numbers: The Role of Statistics in the Armenian Question (1878-1918). Transactions Publishers, 2010. Kévorkian, Raymond. The Armenian Genocide: A Complete History. I.B. Tauris, 2011. Kaiser, Hilmar. The Extermination of Armenians in the Diarbekir Region. İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2014. Kieser, Hans-Lukas, et al., editors. The End of the Ottomans: The Genocide of 1915 and the Politics of Turkish Nationalism. I.B. Tauris, 2019. Kaiser, Hilmar. “Zor District During the Initial Months of the Armenian Genocide.” The First World War as a Caesura?: Demographic Concepts, Population Policy, and Genocide in the Late Ottoman, Russian, and Habsburg Spheres, Duncker & Humblot GmbH, 2020, pp. 109–124.
Sarafian, Ara. “The Absorption of Armenian Women and Children Into Muslim Households as a Structural Component of the Armenian Genocide.” Genocide and Religion in the Twentieth Century, Berghahn Books, Oxford, 2001, pp. 209–221. Üngör, Uğur Ümit. “Orphans, Converts, and Prostitutes: Social Consequences of War and Persecution in the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1923.” War in History, vol. 19, no. 2, Apr. 2012, pp. 173–192. Kurt, Ümit. “Cultural Erasure: The Absorption and Forced Conversion of Armenian Women and Children, 1915-1916.” Études Arméniennes Contemporaines, no. 7, 30 June 2016, https://doi.org/10.4000/eac.997. Kaiser, Hilmar. “Assimilating Armenians, 1915–1917.” Der Genozid an Den ArmenierInnen, 2018, pp. 23–55. Deringil, Selim. “‘your religion is worn and outdated.’” Études Arméniennes Contemporaines, no. 12, 28 Feb. 2019, https://doi.org/10.4000/eac.2090. Kaiser, Hilmar. “The Ottoman Fourth Army’s Orphanage Policy, 1915-1918.” Not All Quiet on the Ottoman Fronts: Neglected Perspectives on a Global War, 1914-1918, Ergon Verlag, 2020, pp. 73–100.
Kaiser, Hilmar. “The Armenians in Lebanon during the Armenian Genocide.” Armenians of Lebanon: From Past Princesses and Refugees to Present-Day Community, Haigazian University Press, 2009, pp. 31–56. Kaiser, Hilmar. “Regional resistance to central government policies: Ahmed Djemal Pasha, the governors of Aleppo, and Armenian deportees in the spring and summer of 1915.” Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 12, no. 3–4, Dec. 2010, pp. 173–218. Shemmassian, Vahram. “Humanitarian Intervention by the Armenian Prelacy of Aleppo during the First Months of the Genocide.” Journal of the Society for Armenian Studies, vol. 22, 2013, pp. 127–152. Kaiser, Hilmar. “Shukru Bey and the Armenian Deportations in the Fall of 1915.” Syria in World War I: Politics, Economy and Society, Routledge, London, 2015. pp. 169-236. Kaiser, Hilmar. “The Armenian Deportees in Hauran and Karak Districts During the Armenian Genocide.” Armenian of Jordan. Proceedings of the Conference 22-24 May 2016, Haigazian University Press, Beirut, 2019, pp. 39–105. Kaiser, Hilmar. “Zor District During the Initial Months of the Armenian Genocide.” The First World War as a Caesura?: Demographic Concepts, Population Policy, and Genocide in the Late Ottoman, Russian, and Habsburg Spheres, Duncker & Humblot GmbH, 2020, pp. 109–124. Mouradian, Khatchig. The Resistance Network: The Armenian Genocide and Humanitarianism in Ottoman Syria, 1915–1918. Michigan State University Press, 2021. Kaiser, Hilmar. “Strategies of survival: Genocide and Armenian Deportee Labor, 1915–1918.” On the Social History of Persecution, 6 Mar. 2023, pp. 15–34.