Weighing the Evidence
Some preliminary thoughts on South Africa's application to the ICJ
[W]e’ll let the lawyers decide internationally whether or not it qualifies [as genocide], but it sure seems that way to me. - President Joe Biden speaking about Ukraine1
South Africa, on Dec. 29th 2023, filed an application to the International Court of Justice to initiate proceedings against Israel. It accuses Israel of incitement and conduct that amount to a violation of the Genocide Convention. The application requests a series of “provisional measures” but they are of little interest for this article. It’s already led to lively discussion, being dismissed as “meritless”,2 having accusations of “cherry picking”3 and “blood libel”4 levied against it, or being uncritically embraced as containing “overwhelming evidence”.5 It makes one yearn for more mature responses like that of France’s ambassador to the United Nation’s - Nicolas de Rivière.6
In this article, I’d like to assess the evidence presented in South Africa’s application and arrive to conclusions as to whether the crime of genocide is being committed or if other crimes better explain Israeli actions. To be clear, this article is not challenging that 1) Israel’s assault against Gaza could escalate into genocide; 2) that Israel’s war is one of the century’s most destructive;7 3) that Israeli policies amount to serious violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL).8
Genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and requirements.
War crimes are generally individual occurrences of murder, rape, looting, pillaging, torture, etc.9 while crimes against humanity are widespread or systematic acts of murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, etc.10 The legal definition of genocide, however, has two elements, a mental (mens rea) and a physical (actus reus) element. To quote article two of the Genocide Convention:11
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
Killing members of the group;
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
To comprehend the mental element, we need to untangle the three bolded issues above. I will not explore the physical element as its rarely difficult to demonstrate and is not the body of the definition.
Intent to destroy is important as it encapsulates the constitutive element of the crime - Special / Specific intent (dolus specialis). What needs to be clarified is the level of intent required - i.e. if dolus specialis includes foreseeable or probable consequence or is limited to acts that aim to destroy the group.12 The existing case law, both trial chamber and appeals chamber, is unanimous that genocide requires the perpetrator have a “particular state of mind (…) with respect to the overall consequence of the prohibited act”.13 Thus, intent to destroy requires that the perpetrator seeks or desires the destruction of the group in whole or in part. Genocide cannot be the product of recklessness or disregard.
How would one demonstrate a perpetrator has the intent to destroy a group? As Leo Kuper notes “governments hardly declare and document genocidal plans in the manner of the Nazis”.14 So, where intent is not susceptible to direct proof, the intent of the perpetrating government has to be inferred. Existing case law is clear that “[w]here an inference needs to be drawn, it has to be the only reasonable inference available on the evidence.”15 According to Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Gacumbitsi genocidal intent “is possible to infer” from the “deeds and utterances [of the perpetrator] considered together” with the general context of the acts.16 “Direct incitement to commit genocide assumes that the speech [is] more than a mere vague or indirect suggestion,”17 whereas intent inferred from a pattern of conduct “is not a question of demonstrating the plausibility or even the likelihood of genocidal intent but rather of eliminating other explanations.”1819 (emphasis mine)
With the designation of destruction in whole or in part, things start to get complicated. Two approaches to the scope of in part have emerged, suggesting both quantitative and qualitative understandings. The original 1946 UN General Assembly resolution defined genocide as the “denial of the right of existence of entire human groups,” which means genocide was not the targeting of individuals but the group.20 However, in 1985 a report to the Sub-commission for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights by Benjamin Whitaker suggested a qualitative interpretation of in part. Based on Whitaker’s proposal, the Krstic and Jelisic trial chambers believed “genocidal intent may (...) be manifest in” the murder of a relatively small portion of a protected group that is so politically prominent that their murder would jeopardize the existence of the group as a whole.21 Both the Jelisic and Sikirica et al trial chambers, however, struggled to put this reasoning into application.22 It inevitably leads to speculation, that's especially hard to ground, about what the killing of one or another stratum of a group will do to its survival as a whole.
The Krstic trial chamber also noted that “the killing of all members of the part of a group located within a small geographical area, although resulting in a lesser number of victims, would qualify as genocide if carried out with the intent to destroy the part of the group as such located in this small geographical area.”23 So to summarize, in part speaks to the intended scope of destruction, be it either a geographic or a numerically significant part, of the group. Some problems exist in the reasoning employed in the judgments but that is a discussion for another day.
Venezuelan delegate, Pérez Perozo, had promoted an amendment to the convention that added the phrase as such as a compromise that prevented the total exclusion of motive “noting that motives were implicitly included in the words”.24 As such is an unenumerated motive requirement. To clarify, motive in this instance means that victims are targeted for membership to a distinct protected class - national, ethnical, racial or religious group. “Mere knowledge by the perpetrators of the victims' membership in a particular group is not sufficient to establish an intention to destroy the group as such.”25
Trial and Appeal Chambers, however, often digress “the necessity to distinguish specific intent from motive. The personal motive of the perpetrator of the crime of genocide may be, for example, to obtain personal economic benefits, or political advantage or some form of power. The existence of a personal motive does not preclude the perpetrator from also having the specific intent to commit genocide.”26 As Cécile Tournaye notes, “[a]t first glance” such statements “could be understood as rejecting discriminatory intent (i.e. motive - D-H) as an element of the crime. (…) In reality, the term 'motive', as used in the Tadid or Jelisic Appeal Judgments, only relates to individual's motivations in knowingly participating in the crime. It thus has a different meaning than the one previously described. In the first context, motive relates to the discriminatory nature of the crime itself, rather than the state of mind of a particular participant.”27
Israel’s pattern of conduct, Is genocide the only inference?
South Africa dedicates 57 paragraphs on pages 30 to 59 to documenting acts that it feels demonstrate a pattern of conduct that amount to “flagrant violations of Israel’s obligations under [the articles] of the Genocide Convention.” South Africa feels that intent may be inferred from the killing of a significant number of Palestinians in Gaza, especially women and children, largely through indiscriminate bombing, although some Gazans “appear to have been summarily executed”. (The Gaza Ministry of Health currently states the total number of documented deaths is 22,835 and injured 58,416.28) Causing widespread hunger, dehydration and starvation29 to the besieged population and failing to provision for the medical needs of Palestinians in Gaza. Failing to provide adequate digression for deconfliction zones or evacuation routes.30 “Imposing measures intended to prevent Palestinian births in Gaza, through the reproductive violence inflicted on Palestinian women, newborn babies, infants, and children.”31
As William Schabas noted about Russia’s aggression against Ukraine “the existence of genocidal intent can never be ruled out entirely.” The same is true for Israel’s war in Gaza. “It is almost always possible that an international armed conflict be pursued with genocidal intent although in practice this is very rarely the case. The same is true of non-international armed conflict that has an ethnic dimension.”32 As things currently stand, there is little evidence, in terms of conduct, that shows Israel seeks to destroy Gazan Palestinians as an ethnic group. The evidence, presented in the media and South Africa’s application, shows that Israel wants to destroy Hamas and is prepared to kill civilians in pursuit of that goal.33
Israel has not displayed any obvious intent to prevent Palestinian births despite South Africa construing so from the high percentage of women among the dead and Israel’s targeted assaults against medical facilities.34
South Africa notes that there are increasing reports, from credible sources, of extrajudicial killings inside Gaza being carried out by Israeli forces. This would seem to be damning conduct as it might demonstrate the perpetration of culpable acts systematically directed against Gazans.35 However, South Africa dedicates little space to such events. These events, however, are reminiscent of potential war crimes and “possibly crimes against humanity” from Operation Cast Lead.36 Israel deployed white phosphorus in urban environments - where it is inherently indiscriminate regardless of intention, allegations of large-scale and deliberate destruction of civilian infrastructure without convincing military rationale, and deliberately firing on civilians in circumstances where they did not present a threat some carrying white flags. It seems to me that the instances of extrajudicial executions are not convincing circumstantial evidence of genocidal intent. They may, however, be indicative of a pattern of wilful killings of unarmed civilians as Israel was accused of in Operation Cast Lead and Operation Protective Edge.37
What about the scale of atrocities committed? Might it be circumstantially indicative of genocidal intent? I am not suggesting that genocide has a minimum threshold for the number of victims. The case law outright rejects such a notion.38 However, if we are to evaluate scale as evidence of genocidal intent, the number of individuals killed should be evaluated against the overall size of the targeted group. In Croatia v. Serbia at the ICJ, it was submitted that the murder of 12,500 was genocide. The Judgement observed that “even assuming that this figure is correct — an issue on which it will make no ruling — the number of victims alleged by Croatia is small in relation to the size of the targeted part of the group.”39
Currently, Gaza’s population is estimated at 2.3 million.40 The Gaza Ministry of Health has documented at least 22,835 deaths while the organization Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor estimates 30,676 deaths.41 I admit that neither figure is compelling when one considers the precedent of the quantitative criterion.42
Israel is planning, as I write, to challenge South Africa’s application in the International Court of Justice. According to Axios, Malcolm Shaw’s - Israel’s representative lawyer - strategy will be to focus on “Israel's efforts to increase humanitarian aid to the population in Gaza and to decrease the number of civilians who are killed”.43 There are obvious flaws with this approach - the admission of humanitarian aid is largely influenced by international (specifically U.S.) pressure and seems to be an initially unintended shift in policy.44 South Africa’s team in court will have to deal with such “counter facts” as Amichai Cohen and Yuval Shany argue.45 This means they will have to explain away convincingly; A) measures taken by Israel to reduce civilian casualties,46 B) cited tactical or strategic reasons by Israel for hitting civilian objects,47 C) Israel’s opening of humanitarian provisions.48 Simply demonstrating that such measures are ineffective or actions taken are disproportionate is not sufficient.
Words That Might Kill - “Expressions” of Genocidal Intent
South Africa does not solely argue that intent can be inferred. On pages 59 to 67, the application cites repeated statements made by Israeli State representatives such as the Prime Minister, President, Minister of Defence, etc. What needs to be evaluated is if these statements meet the standards for “direct and public incitement”, i.e. the language is “more than a mere vague or indirect suggestion.”
The most damning statement from South Africa's application is Knesset Deputy Speaker Nissim Vaturi's tweet "[n]ow we all have one common goal — erasing the Gaza Strip from the face of the earth." He's decided to double down on this and other statements49 saying “I stand behind my words. It is better to burn down buildings rather than have soldiers harmed. There are no innocents there.”50
Other statements include; 1) Heritage Minister, Amichai Eliyahu, stating there are “no innocents” in Gaza and calling for the dropping of a nuclear weapon on the Gaza Strip.51 2) Minister of Agriculture, Avi Dichter, stating that “[w]e are now actually rolling out the Gaza Nakba”.52 3) Finance Minister, Bezalel Smotrich, has said the state should “encourage emigration” because “if there are 100,000 or 200,000 Arabs in Gaza (…) the entire discussion on the day after will be totally different.”53 4) National Security Minister, Itamar Ben Gvir, has stated “those who celebrate, those who support, and those who hand out candy” should be “destroyed”54 and advocated “encouraging the residents of Gaza to emigrate”.55
The Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, has censured these officials publicly or by proxy.56 But, as Cohen and Shany note in their article, “[w]hile Israel’s political leadership distanced itself from potentially genocidal language, it has also failed to apply meaningful political sanctions against the politicians making these comments.”57
Netanyahu is quoted multiple times equating Hamas with Amalek,58 Israel’s ancient biblical enemy in the Hebrew Bible. While irresponsible, it’s debatable in this context if these are calls for the annihilation of Palestinians.59 His use of Amalek in the speech is consistent with past identifications with security threats to Israel rather than peoples.60
The same goes for the Minister of Defence, Yoav Gallant, referring to those “we are fighting”, Hamas, as “human animals”.61 Gallant has explicitly stated “our war against Hamas (...) [is] not a war against the people of Gaza.”62 It seems to me those touting such statements as explicit incitement to genocide is ignoring the much stronger argument that such rhetoric blurs distinctions between Hamas and Palestinians.63
The same can be said of a statement from the President of Israel, Isaac Herzog, who said that the Gazan population was morally complicit with Hamas rule:
It's an entire nation out there that is responsible. This rhetoric about civilians not aware, not involved—it's not true. They could've risen up, fought against that evil regime.64 (emphasis mine)
South Africa claims that Issac Herzog’s statement is an admission that “Israel was not distinguishing between militants and civilians in Gaza”. Herzog explicitly rejected this characterization of his words in the same press conference.65 Unacknowledged in the judgment, as Cohen and Shany note, Herzog also clarified “[o]f course there are many, many innocent Palestinians who don’t agree to [terrorism].”66 Many of the statements, cited by South Africa, appear to not be unambiguous evidence of genocidal intent or have been subject to minimal censure.
South Africa also cites statements from Israeli army soldiers to corroborate its allegation on page 65. They, however, ignore the censuring and punishing of Israeli soldiers for analogous statements.67
Conclusion
Currently, we are in a provisional measures phase at the ICJ. While I argue that South Africa’s submission does not meet the evidentiary standards to conclude that Israel has engaged in genocide, the ICJ does not have to rule currently if Israel is committing genocide. They are instead evaluating the risk of Israel committing genocide in Gaza. In Gambia V. Myanmar the order for provisional measures stated:
30. For the purposes of the present proceedings, the Court is not required to ascertain whether any violations of Myanmar’s obligations under the Genocide Convention have occurred. Such a finding, which notably depends on the assessment of the existence of an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the group of the Rohingya as such, could be made by the Court only at the stage of the examination of the merits of the present case. What the Court is required to do at the stage of making an order on provisional measures is to establish whether the acts complained of by The Gambia are capable of falling within the provisions of the Genocide Convention. In the Court’s view, at least some of the acts alleged by The Gambia are capable of falling within the provisions of the Convention.
31. The Court finds therefore that the above-mentioned elements are sufficient at this stage to establish prima facie the existence of a dispute between the Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Genocide Convention.68
This means that even if the current evidence is unsatisfactory, meaning the evidence would not lead to a conviction in another context, this is not an obstacle to the ICJ finding Israel’s actions within the provisions of the Genocide Convention. It only means the requirements for provisional measures need to be met. While the ICJ has the same strict standard for inference by pattern of conduct: “in order to infer the existence of dolus specialis from a pattern of conduct, it is necessary and sufficient that this is the only inference that could reasonably be drawn from the acts in question.”69 It only needs to rule that current IHL violations could escalate into a situation that would meet the legal requirements.
John Kirby, White House National Security Council spokesman, said the U.S. views South Africa's “submission [as] meritless, counterproductive, and completely without any basis in fact whatsoever.”
Eylon Levy, an Israeli spokesperson, described South Africa's submission as "blood libel" and accused the state of having "made itself criminally complicit with Hamas's campaign of genocide against our people."
Owen Jones, for example, has described the content of the application as “overwhelming”. The document, according to him, is “one of the most important things written in our time”. Francis Boyle, who once served as counsel for Bosnia and Herzegovina at the ICJ, has opined that “I believe South Africa will win an order against Israel to cease and desist from committing all acts of genocide against the Palestinians.” John J. Mearsheimer has said the document “is comprehensive, well-written, well-argued, and thoroughly documented.”
Such as Israel’s continued destruction of greenhouses and farmland; denial of entry to water, food, or aid (obviously over 6,000 trucks of aid have entered since, but pre-war 500 trucks crossed the border per day, or 15,000 a month, leading to obvious concerns of bottlenecking. Something Israel has done in the past. ); Israels indiscriminate bombing of Gaza; reported extrajudicial executions; employment of white phosphorus in urban environments; or seeming Falujah esque rules of engagement. Israel has, in fact, gone a long way to warping IHL to try and fit its campaign.
Prosecutor v. Dusko Sikirica, Damir Dosen, Dragan Kolundzija (Sentencing Judgement), IT-95-8-S, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 13 November 2001, para. 571.
Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic (Trial Judgement), IT-95-10-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 14 December 1999, paras. 46. Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic (Trial Judgement), International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 2 August 2001, para. 561. Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic (Appeal Judgement), IT-95-10-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 5 July 2001, para. 46. Prosecutor v. Dusko Sikirica, Damir Dosen, Dragan Kolundzija (Judgement on Defence Motions to Acquit), IT-95-8-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 3 September 2001, paras. 571. Prosecutor v. Blagojevic and Jokic (Trial Judgment), IT-02-60-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 17 January 2005, 17 January 2005, para. 656. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (Trial Judgement), ICTR-96-4-T, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 2 September 1998, para. 497, 544-7. The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana (Trial Judgement), ICTR-95-1-T, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 21 May 1999, para. 91.
Kuper Leo. Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century. Yale University Press 1982. pp. 35.
Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdjanin (Trial Judgement), IT-99-36-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 1 September 2004, para. 970. Rukundo v. The Prosecutor (Appeal Judgment), Case No. ICTR-2001-70-A, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 20 October 2010, para. 235-238.
The Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Gacumbitsi (Trial Judgement), ICTR-2001-64-T, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 17 June 2004. para. 252-3.
Schabas, William A. “Genocide and Ukraine.” Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 20, no. 4, 2022, pp. 850.
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic (Trial Judgement), International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 2 August 2001, para. 552.
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic (Trial Judgement), International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 2 August 2001, para. 634. Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic (Trial Judgement), IT-95-10-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 14 December 1999, paras. 82.
Alonzo-Maizlish, David. “In Whole or In Part: Group Rights, the Intent Element of Genocide, and the ‘Quantitative Criterion.’” New York University Law Review, vol. 77, no. 5, Nov. 2002, pp. 1369–1403.
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic (Trial Judgement), International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 2 August 2001, para. 590.
Eliézer Niyitegeka v. The Prosecutor (Appeal Judgment), ICTR-96-14-A, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 9 July 2004, para. 49.
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic (Trial Judgement), International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 2 August 2001, para. 561.
Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic (Appeal Judgement), IT-95-10-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 5 July 2001, paras. 49.
Tournaye, Cécile. “Genocidal Intent before the ICTY.” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 52, no. 2, 2003, pp. 452–3.
See this report by CNN. From what is currently clear the figures are generally reliable.
A White House spokesman told Washington Post that Israel has “conducted airstrikes inside the supposedly safer areas”. “[W]e’ve expressed our concern to Israel that they are taking strikes in deconfliction areas”. Back in November, Axios analysis of satellite photography showed that Israel struck “areas along the main evacuation routes, even after urging civilians from the north to relocate” to the south.
Schabas, William A. “Genocide and Ukraine.” Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 20, no. 4, 2022, pp. 849.
The current pattern of conduct is more suggestive of a disregard for civilians rather than a desire to inflict. Israel has been using an AI system, dubbed “Habsora” ("The Gospel"), which can generate 100 bombing targets a day. U.S. officials have expressed concern that “they do not know exactly how IDF commanders are assessing the threshold for civilian casualties — even as they publicly urge Israel to minimize the death of innocents.” One senior State Department official, speaking anonymously to the Washington Post, expressed that despite the reduction of airstrikes “strikes were still causing dramatic casualties.” +972 Magazine’s investigation, based on confidential interviews, established that Israel has loosened the rules of engagement allowing for the use of disproportionate weapons that cause excessive destruction and casualties even when there is only one specific target.
In mid-December, U.S. intelligence disclosed an assessment that “of the more than 29,000 air-to-ground munitions [that Israel has fired] into the Palestinian enclave since Oct. 7, (…) only 55 to 60 percent of them have been precision-guided.” Assessment of satellite photography by the New York Times and CNN hearkens back to Rear Admiral Hagari’s statement of Oct 10th that “between accuracy and the scale of damage, right now we are busy with what generates maximum damage”.
Forensic Architecture has aggregated news reports since Oct 7th about Israel’s assault on Gaza. It shows “a repeated pattern of intimidation, direct targeting, siege, and occupation by the Israeli military” against hospitals. CNN has corroborated Forensic Architectures report. Based on 45 satellite images and +400 videos they have documented 20 out of 22 hospitals were damaged or destroyed in the first two months of the war. Several appeared to have been attacked by Israel.
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has received credible reports of “11 unarmed Palestinian men [being executed] in front of their family members in Al Remal neighbourhood”. A recent incident, the killing of three Israeli hostages by the IDF, has raised concerns about the IDF’s “rules of engagement”. Video of a Palestinian woman being shot, while waving a white flag next to her child, by Israeli forces and CCTV footage, allegedly, showing evacuating Palestinians being struck by a drone have leaked. ITV reported a third incident of Israeli soldiers firing on and killing an individual waving a white flag. +972 magazine reports that Israeli soldiers have “license to kill innocent Palestinians without repercussions.” Israeli forces have also, allegedly, fired on Palestinians in Gaza City who were waiting on humanitarian aid.
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 25 September 2009. Also see Goldstone’s retraction of the allegation that Israel had deliberately targeted civilians.
As was alleged by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and UN Human Rights Council report cited in fn.37
“There is no numeric threshold of victims necessary to establish genocide, even though the relative proportionate scale of the actual or attempted destruction of a group, by any act listed in Article 2 of the Statute, is strong evidence to prove the necessary intent to destroy a group in whole or in part.” The Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Gacumbitsi (Trial Judgement), ICTR-2001-64-T, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 17 June 2004. para. 253.
Schabas, William A. “Genocide and Ukraine.” Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 20, no. 4, 2022, pp. 851.
Alonzo-Maizlish, David. “In Whole or In Part: Group Rights, the Intent Element of Genocide, and the ‘Quantitative Criterion.’” New York University Law Review, vol. 77, no. 5, Nov. 2002, pp. 1369–1403.
Originally, on Oct 9th, 2023, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant ordered a “complete siege” of Gaza stating “There will be no electricity, no food, no fuel, everything is closed." A decision that was heavily criticized by the international community. Israel, on Oct 15th, resumed water supply to southern Gaza after U.S. pressure. On Dec 2nd the first aid trucks entered Rafah via Egypt. Since then over 6,000 aid trucks have entered Gaza but this is far below the pre-war average of 500 crossings a day. The Israeli cabinet is currently “considering several potential concessions for Gaza” because of the growing criticism of Israel’s war.
This would be the extensive use of advance warnings such as evacuation orders, dropping of flyers, text messages or phone calls, publishing maps online advising gazans where to evacuate and even the controversial “roof knocking”.
Such as Israel’s excuse for targeting the Jabalia refugee camp.
See fn 44.
In a radio interview Heritage Minister, Amichai Eliyahu, said on Nov. 1st that dropping a nuclear weapon on the Gaza Strip is “an option”.
Asked in a news interview, on Nov. 11th, if the images of Gazan residents fleeing Gaza City were comparable to images from the Nakba the Agriculture Minister, Avi Dichter, replied “We are now rolling out the Gaza Nakba. From an operational point of view, there is no way to wage a war – as the IDF seeks to do in Gaza – with masses between the tanks and the soldiers.”
Nov. 11th interview with Itamar Ben-Gvir on Channel 12. Quoted in South African Judgement as stating “[t]o be clear, when we say that Hamas should be destroyed, it also means those who celebrate, those who support, and those who hand out candy — they’re all terrorists, and they should also be destroyed.”
Ben Gvir, on Telegram, posted an Israel Hayom article captioning it “There is a solution: Emigration now!” and in a speech stated “[e]ncouraging the residents of Gaza to emigrate is a solution we must advance”. Even stating on X that “the migration of hundreds of thousands from Gaza will allow the residents of the enclave to return home and live in security and protect soldiers.”
Netanyahu has responded that Amichai Eliyahu’s “statements are not based in reality.” Eliyahu has been suspended - although there are reports that he voted the day after his suspension. Netanyahu rebuked Avi Dichter and warned ministers stating “[e]very word has meaning when it comes to diplomacy. If you don’t know — don’t speak. We must be sensitive.” Bibi, according to a U.S. official who talked with Politico, has admitted to losing control of his ministers stating “My hands are tied. You know, I have this coalition. It’s not me. It’s a coalition. It’s not me. It’s the political imperatives that I’m facing.” Which might explain why he, originally, condemned Ben-Gvir and Smotrich by proxy. Although “U.S. officials say they have been reassured that the proposals do not represent official Israeli policy.” It is worth noting reports have leaked of negotiations between Israel and the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, and Rwanda to receive “voluntary migrants” from Gaza. Israel and Congo have since denied these reports but “Netanyahu’s office and the Israeli Foreign Ministry” initially declined to comment.
At the start of the speech, Netanyahu makes it clear that Israel’s goal is “destroying Hamas’ military and governing capabilities, and bringing the captives back home.”
Moses, A. Dirk. “Genocide and the terror of history.” Parallax, vol. 17, no. 4, 2011, pp. 97.
This, of course, is an inquiry of academic interest rather than a legal violation. See Straus, Scott. The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda. Cornell University Press, 2008. Chapter 5.
As stated by Yahoo news: “At another point in the press conference, Herzog presented a different perspective, saying, “Of course there are many, many innocent Palestinians who don’t agree to this — but unfortunately in their homes, there are missiles shooting at us, at my children.””
Such as Rabbi Amichai Friedman who, addressing a young group of soldiers, said “...the land is OURS. The whole country! All of it! Including Gaza! Including Lebanon! The whole promised land!” Who was summoned for inquiries.
Schabas, William A. “Genocide and Ukraine.” Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 20, no. 4, 2022, pp. 850.